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INTRODUCTION 
The First Amendment right of “expressive association” gives an 
organization a pass on antidiscrimination laws if compliance would 
result in the dilution or obfuscation of its message.  But the pass will 
not issue on its mere say-so.  It must show three things:  (1) it is an 
expressive organization with a particular message to send; (2) it will 
not be able to send that message, at least in the manner it would pre-
fer, if it cannot exclude certain people; and (3) its expressive interest 
in exclusion is not outweighed by the public’s interest in inclusion.  
The first two prongs are questions of fact, and the third is more a 
question of law. 
This Article focuses on the second prong of that analysis and, in 
particular, on the “message attribution” claim.  Simply put, the mes-
sage attribution claim is that:  “If we include X as a member, we will 
be sending the message that we like what X stands for.  But, we do 
not want to send that message because we do not like what X stands 
for.  Therefore, we have an expressive interest in excluding X.” 
To be very clear—and this is important—message attribution 
claims are not the only ticket through the second prong of the ex-
pressive association analysis.  An organization could also argue that 
unwanted members will alter its very character or expressive agenda, 
or that they will positively obstruct its expression in some way.  But 
this could be true without the views those unwanted members repre-
sent actually being attributed to the organization.  This will become 
clearer below when I address the seminal expressive association cases. 
If a court accepts a message attribution claim, it is accepting three 
things.  First, it is accepting that X will be seen as standing for some-
thing.  Second, it is accepting that the organization’s audience—
internal or external—will actually get the impression, or draw the in-
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ference, that the organization likes what X stands for, essentially by 
attributing X’s message or views to the organization.  And third, it is 
accepting that this impression or inference is a reasonable one.  
Framing the issue this way brings an important feature of message at-
tribution claims into sharper focus.    
 When courts ask what message an unwanted member’s presence 
in an organization will send, or whether the unwanted member’s 
presence in the organization will compromise its message, what they 
are really asking is what impressions a third party will get, or what in-
ferences that third party will draw, from that unwanted member’s 
presence.  In other words, expressive association claims are not based 
on anything an organization must say or is forbidden from saying; 
they are based on speculation about what other people might think.
 So long as this is the analysis, nearly all message attribution claims 
are doomed to fail.  Virtually no organization, merely by accepting a 
member it would rather reject, necessarily emits approval of what that 
unwanted member is presumed to stand for.  To the contrary, it will 
almost always be the case that an unwanted member’s presence in an 
organization can mean any number of things beyond the organiza-
tion’s approval of what he or she stands for.  I will say a lot about Boy 
Scouts of America v. Dale below, in which the Supreme Court affirmed 
the Scouts’ First Amendment right to exclude a gay scoutmaster, but I 
will say just this here.  Suppose James Dale wrote the book on knot-
tying and was in fact the world’s leading authority on rope knots.  
Would that not be a huge enticement for the Boy Scouts, even if the 
organization was somewhat bothered, or even greatly bothered, by his 
homosexuality?  If so, what might that say about the reasonableness 
of a third party’s impression or inference that because the Boy Scouts 
welcomes a gay scoutmaster, it is accepting of his homosexuality?  Do 
we not all find various faults in people we associate with, even those 
we love deeply, but value the association nonetheless because the 
pros outweigh the cons?  If we really value the freedom of association, 
then, we are going to have to do better than a message attribution 
claim to identify the expressive interest at issue, if not abandon ex-
pression altogether as the constitutional interest on the line. 
 To be clear, message attribution claims may be vulnerable for 
other reasons too.  It may be, for example, that X’s message—“what X 
stands for”—is itself contested.  This was a huge issue in Dale, of 
course; many critics were outraged that the Supreme Court accepted, 
on seemingly very little evidence, the Boy Scouts’ claim that by merely 
identifying as gay, Dale was the equivalent of a gay rights activist who 
would promote a particular view of homosexuality.  In this Article, I 
am more interested in the message attribution claim that lies at the 
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heart of the expressive association cases.  I want to take on the rea-
soning by which a member’s message—assuming there is one—is 
thought to be attributable to his organization. 
I acknowledge that this Article arrives pretty late to the academic 
literature on this topic.  In 2000, when Dale was decided, it started a 
kind of wildfire in the constitutional law of free association.  Count-
less scholars parachuted in pretty quickly to put this fire out, control 
the burn, or fight it in some other way.  (Not nearly so many para-
chuted in to add more antidiscrimination laws to the fire.)  Some of 
those efforts took on Dale specifically, and some of them also took on 
the very idea of yoking free association to free speech in the first 
place.  The next time a big expressive association case presented it-
self, involving the opposition of law schools to a federal law that re-
quired them to allow military recruiters full access to their students, 
the fallout was not nearly so dramatic.1  This is probably because, as 
much as the law schools did not want to accommodate the military 
recruiters, they really had no argument and were told as much by a 
unanimous Supreme Court.2 
In any event, exhausted as the expressive association flare-up 
caused by Dale may seem, I think there is still room for the point I 
want to make in this Article about message attribution claims.  When 
we ask how an organization’s message will be distorted by the pres-
ence of an unwanted member, we are really asking what a third party 
will think.  And whatever that third party’s impression—whatever in-
ference he or she actually draws—the organization’s approval of what 
the unwanted member stands for will always be one of a number of 
possible explanations for that member’s presence, and it will rarely 
be the most reasonable. 
In Part I, I take a step back from the law and highlight implicit 
message attribution claims in everyday public discourse.  There are 
two points in doing this.  First, that message attribution claims are not 
peculiar to First Amendment jurisprudence.  Second, it may be bene-
ficial to bring some of the common-sense intuitions we bring to eve-
ryday message attribution claims to their constitutional counterparts. 
In Parts II and III, I introduce the expressive association doctrine 
and detail what I consider to be the important expressive association 
cases.  Again, not all present pure message attribution claims.  As we 
will see, the Boy Scouts’ interest in excluding gays relies much more 
on message attribution logic than, for example, the Jaycees’ interest 
 
 1 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006). 
 2 Id. 
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in not admitting women as full members.  Still, it is worth discussing 
these cases in sequence, and readers who are mildly familiar with the 
cases can safely skip Part III. 
In Part IV, I explore the criticisms of Dale, which I argue are vari-
ous ways of undermining expressive association claims more general-
ly.  I focus on Dale only because it has generated the most commen-
tary, and because I think it presents the purest (and probably most 
problematic) message attribution claim.  The point in Part IV is not 
to refute these criticisms, but to show that they are on some level un-
necessary and that there is room for my own criticism, namely that 
the logic of message attribution claims is fundamentally flawed. 
Part IV is where I develop the argument that the mere presence of 
an unwanted member in an organization almost never necessarily 
means that the organization accepts what that member stands for.  
There are always other possible explanations, namely that the un-
wanted member offers something else that makes his inclusion a net 
gain for the organization.  Indeed, just as we take the bad with the 
good in our personal relationships, and are never presumed to ap-
plaud every last thing our friends and loved ones do, organizations 
should not be presumed to sign onto every aspect or stance of their 
members’ lives. 
Also, I survey a number of other cases—most of them compelled 
speech cases—in which courts, almost always without much discus-
sion, have rejected message attribution claims.  There are two points 
in conducting this survey.  First, if courts are so dismissive of message 
attribution claims in compelled speech cases, why do they seem to 
take them more seriously in expressive association cases?  Second, 
courts consider message attribution claims on an ad hoc basis, with-
out any discernible methodology or standard.  Forcing the Boy Scouts 
to include a gay scoutmaster would force it to send a message that it 
approves of homosexuality, and that is that.  On the other hand, re-
quiring law schools to accommodate military recruiters would not 
force them to send a message that they are supportive of “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell,” and again, that is that.  We never get much of a working 
theory that explains the distinction.  This may not be a weakness in 
the doctrine per se, but it definitely leaves something to be desired in 
the adjudication of real cases.  
I.  MESSAGE ATTRIBUTION CLAIMS IN EVERYDAY DISCOURSE 
First, I would like to take a step back from the expressive associa-
tion doctrine and the case law responsible for that doctrine and high-
light non-legal instances involving message attribution claims, or in 
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which the logic of message attribution claims appears.  It is important 
to see message attribution claims as rather straightforward attempts 
to disassociate from objectionable speech and to expose the logic be-
hind them.  The intuitions most of us bring to these everyday disasso-
ciation attempts, I suggest, are equally useful when it comes to rea-
soning through the big expressive association cases and the message 
attribution claims in those cases. 
For a familiar example, consider the common practice of authors 
with some kind of institutional affiliation—say, attorneys in large law 
firms or government lawyers—writing something for public consump-
tion and mentioning in their bylines that they speak only for them-
selves.3  Academics do it too.4  Now, these are not message attribution 
claims of the kind that are made in cases like Dale—no one is trying 
to discriminate—but they do betray a comparable logic or worry, 
namely that some third party observer will take the writer’s message 
to be that of his institution.  The writer knows that he speaks only for 
himself, and so does the institution.  What motivates the disclaimer is 
some conjecture about what the reader might think; the disclaimer 
guards against the potential reaction of a third party. 
Here is another example.  It is very common for movie DVDs with 
extra features (such as interviews with the director or actors) to offer 
up front something like the following disclaimer:  Any views or opin-
ions expressed in interviews or commentary are those of the individ-
uals speaking and do not necessarily represent the views or opinions 
of Universal Studios Home Entertainment, its parent, or any of its af-
filiates or employees.  There again, those offering commentary likely 
know they speak only for themselves, as does the film studio, but 
there is apparently a worry that third parties will think otherwise.  
This example is not exactly the kind of message attribution claim in 
Dale, but the logic of it is indistinguishable.  In Dale, the organization 
attempted to disassociate by discrimination; here (and in the above 
example), there is an attempt to disassociate by disclaimer (first by 
the organization and second by the speaker) based on the concern 
 
 3 See, e.g., George S. Howard, State high court to hear sampling case, L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 19, 
2012, at 4 (“George S. Howard Jr. is a partner at Jones Day.  Mr. Howard practices labor 
and employment law on behalf of management . . . . The views expressed in this article 
are those of Mr. Howard alone and not those of his firm or its clients.”). 
 4 See, e.g., Marc R. Poirier, Name Calling:  Identifying Stigma in the “Civil Union”/”Marriage” 
Distinction, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1427 n.* (2009) (“The opinions expressed herein are 
those of its author and not of his employer, Seton Hall University, the Catholic university 
in New Jersey.”); see also Steffen N. Johnson, Expressive Association and Organizational Au-
tonomy, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1639, 1639 n.† (2001) (“The views herein are solely my own.”). 
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that an individual’s message will be attributed to an entity of which he 
is only a small part. 
We also see disassociation attempts, and the same logic of message 
attribution claims, as a response to public relations nightmares for 
companies embarrassed or shamed by an employee’s conduct.  In 
February 2011, for example, Christian Dior Creative Director John 
Galliano was caught on camera in a Paris bar, drunk, saying to wom-
en at a neighboring table, “I love Hitler,” and “People like you would 
be dead.  Your mothers, your forefathers, would all be fucking 
gassed.”5  Provocations on the runway are one thing; anti-Semitic 
provocations in a country that takes racism seriously are quite anoth-
er.  And so, Galliano was fired. 
But Dior did not just fire Galliano and leave it at that.  When he 
was arrested for his remarks, the Dior chairman said, “Christian Dior 
has an unequivocal zero-tolerance policy regarding anti-Semitism and 
racism.”6  And upon his firing, the fashion house said basically the 
same thing in a statement:  “We unequivocally condemn the state-
ments made by John Galliano, which are in total contradiction to the 
longstanding core values of Christian Dior.”7  In other words, Dior 
disavowed Galliano’s speech for fear that it would be attributed to 
Dior, or at least that Dior would be seen as accepting of or ambivalent 
toward it if it said and did nothing. 
A third example:  In September 2007, the President of Iran, 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, spoke at Columbia University, where he was 
introduced by Columbia’s president, Lee Bollinger.  Bollinger’s in-
troduction was lengthy and confrontational, and in the beginning he 
preemptively disavowed Ahmadinejad’s speech, saying, 
It should never be thought that merely to listen to ideas we deplore in 
any way implies our endorsement of those ideas or our weakness of our 
resolve to resist those ideas or our naivety about the very real dangers in-
herent in such ideas.  It is a critical premise of freedom of speech that we 
do not honor the dishonorable when we open our public forum to their 
voices.8   
 
 5 Richard White, Film of Galliano’s racist rant in bar, THE SUN (London), Feb. 14, 2013, avail-
able at http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/3436757/Film-of-John-Gallianos-
racist-rant-in-bar.html (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 6 Hannah Elliott, John Galliano Arrest:  Full Statement from Dior, FORBES (Feb. 25, 2011, 10:46 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/hannahelliott/2011/02/25/full-statement-from-dior-
about-john-gallianos-arrest/ (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 7 Belinda White, Christian Dior sacks John Galliano, TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. 1, 2011, 
http://fashion.telegraph.co.uk/news-features/TMG8354927/Christian-Dior-commence-
termination-proceedings-with-John-Galliano.html (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 8 President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Speech at Columbia University (Sept. 24, 2007), 
available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/full-transcript-of-ahmadinejad-speech-at-
 
May 2013] EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION DOCTRINE 1461 
 
Bollinger then transitioned to a critique of Iran and President 
Ahmadinejad that culminated in the line, “I feel all the weight of the 
modern civilized world yearning to express the revulsion at what you 
stand for.”9  During the speech, he said, “You are either brazenly pro-
vocative or astonishingly uneducated,” and “Mr. President, you exhib-
it all the signs of a petty and cruel dictator.”10  President Bollinger 
made it very clear, in other words, that whatever was about to come 
out of President Ahmadinejad’s mouth in no way had the imprimatur 
of Columbia. 
It is useful to see that in each of the above examples the logic of a 
message attribution claim is at work:  one party is worried that what 
another says may be attributed to it, or identified with it, or under-
stood to be endorsed by it.  And so it takes affirmative steps to disas-
sociate.  That is exactly what happens in the expressive association 
context, only rather than issue a disclaimer that does the disassociat-
ing, organizations aim to discriminate to avoid the association in the 
first place.  In Dale, the Boy Scouts’ alleged message was to be pre-
served by outright exclusion.  In the above examples, exclusion was 
not a meaningful possibility—Dior did not know Galliano would go 
overboard in a Paris café, and Columbia had countervailing reasons 
for wanting to welcome President Ahmadinejad to campus—and so a 
disclaimer had to do the job. 
But in each of the above examples—and, as I will argue below, 
with respect to the expressive association context—we would do well 
to ask if the fear of attribution, or of being seen as ambivalent, is real-
ly so reasonable.  Do readers of law review articles need to be told 
that the author’s views are the author’s views, and not those of his 
home institution?  Or are people who read law review articles, on the 
other hand, sophisticated enough to know this? 
Likewise, do we need a fashion house to affirm its commitment to 
equality when a notoriously eccentric designer—a designer known 
for his zaniness and his willingness to go too far—praises one of the 
great moral scourges in the history of humankind?  Or, is the reason-
able view that the designer can be an odd bird, but the fashion house 
employs him because of his way with fabrics and tailoring?  Now, 
some people might boycott Dior just because they do not care to own 
anything Galliano had a hand in designing or do not want to con-
 
columbia-university/6889) (prefacing remarks by President Bollinger of Columbia Uni-
versity). 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
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tribute to his income, but if that is the case, Dior needed only to fire 
him.  It did not need to go the extra step of disavowing his speech. 
And President Bollinger?  Was his verbal assault in the introduc-
tion of President Ahmadinejad really so necessary?  Did the Columbia 
community really need some reassurance that the global political vi-
sion of a theocratic leader in the Middle East is not exactly Colum-
bia’s vision?  President Ahmadinejad called President Bollinger out 
for this when he finally took the microphone: 
At the outset, I want to complain a bit on the person who read this politi-
cal statement against me.  In Iran, tradition requires that when we de-
mand a person to invite us as a—to be a speaker, we actually respect our 
students and the professors by allowing them to make their own judg-
ment, and we don’t think it’s necessary before the speech is even given to 
come in with a series of claims and to attempt in a so-called manner to 
provide vaccination of some sort to our students and our faculty.11 
If President Bollinger had let Ahmadinejad speak, it may have 
been that nothing might have come out of his mouth.  With the intro-
duction he gave, though, he really threw President Ahmadinejad a 
bone. 
These examples are not exactly on all fours with the expressive as-
sociation cases I will discuss below, but I think it is important to see 
the way in which they present a kind of message attribution claim.  It 
is important, too, to mine them for our intuitive reactions to the mes-
sage attribution claims, and to wear these intuitions as a kind of head-
lamp into what is sometimes the constitutional darkness of expressive 
association doctrine. 
II.  A VERY BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION 
DOCTRINE 
At least as things stand now, the Constitution does not protect the 
freedom of association in any robust or absolutist sense.  There is a 
right to associate for expressive purposes under the First Amend-
ment,12 and there is a right of intimate association with a less clear 
constitutional source.13  That is it, though.  For example, the Supreme 
 
 11 Id. 
 12 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (“Effective advocacy of 
both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably en-
hanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking 
on the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly.”). 
 13 Less clear does not mean unclear, however.  The prevailing view in the case law seems to 
be that the intimate association right is rooted in the liberty protections of the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  See, e.g., Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 42 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (pointing out language in previous cases suggesting that the right to intimate 
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Court, in City of Dallas v. Stanglin, rejected a First Amendment free-
dom-of-association challenge to a Texas law that restricted admission 
to certain dance clubs to fourteen through eighteen-year-olds, noting 
that “the First Amendment does not in terms protect a ‘right of asso-
ciation’”—only “such a right in certain circumstances.”14 
In other words, “[t]he doctrine is penumbral; it assists in the en-
joyment of other rights but does not stand on its own.”15  So, an or-
ganization’s raw interest in limiting its membership to a certain class 
or certain classes of people—or, in the case of Stanglin, opening mem-
bership—receives less constitutional protection than its interest in 
not being understood as liking that class of people; repugnance mat-
ters less than conveying repugnance.  Maybe this is a good thing, de-
spite the argument of some that it misunderstands the value of asso-
ciation and its relationship to speech,16 misunderstands the 
constitutional priority of association vis-à-vis speech,17 misses the 
 
association is a “component of the personal liberty protected by the Due Process 
Clause”); Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544, 1546–47 (10th Cir. 1993) (categorizing the 
right of intimate association as a substantive due process right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment).  There is also an argument, however, that the intimate association right, 
just like the expressive association right, is rooted in the First Amendment.  A number of 
scholars have written on this.  See, e.g., Nancy Catharine Marcus, The Freedom of Intimate As-
sociation in the Twenty First Century, 16 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 269, 275 (2006) (arguing 
that the right to intimate association implicates a First Amendment analysis); Collin 
O’Connor Udell, Intimate Association:  Resurrecting a Hybrid Right, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 
231, 236 (1998) (making the argument that First Amendment doctrine is useful in inti-
mate association cases). 
 14 City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 23–24 (1989). 
 15 David McGowan, Making Sense of Dale, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 121, 131 (2001). 
 16 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, for example, has sharply argued that the value of association lies 
more in the formation of views than in their ultimate expression.  See, e.g., Seana Valentine 
Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 839, 840–41 
(2005) (“Associations have an intimate connection to freedom of speech values not solely 
because they can be mechanisms for message dissemination or sites for the pursuit of 
shared aims.  Associations have an intimate connection to freedom of speech values in 
large part because they are special sites for the generation and germination of thoughts 
and ideas.  As with compelled speech, our concern should be turned inward onto the in-
ternal thinking process of group members, rather than predominantly on whether there 
is confusion in the transmission of a group’s message.”); see also George Kateb, The Value 
of Association, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 35 (Amy Guttman ed., 1998) (expressing frus-
tration that “association is instrumentally yoked to speech and is protected only because 
speech is protected”). 
 17 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978 (2011).  Bhagwat argues that 
the tendency “to treat the associational right as subsidiary to free speech and . . . to as-
sume that the primary purpose of association is to facilitate speech” is both “ahistorical 
and incorrect.”  Id. at 1029.  In fact, Bhagwat argues, “speech is often subsidiary to associ-
ation,” and both have as their common goal the enabling of self-governance.  Id.; see also 
Jason Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639, 645 (2002) (“[T]he modern 
notion of ‘expression’ is a dubious peg on which to hang a constitutional right of free as-
sociation.”). 
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broader importance of organizational autonomy,18 is not really that 
workable as constitutional doctrine,19 or is otherwise philosophically 
objectionable.20  Were it otherwise, the many anti-discrimination and 
public accommodation laws on the books, which these days are offen-
sive only to hardline libertarians, would probably be in serious trou-
ble.21 
This Article will focus only on “message attribution” expressive as-
sociation claims.22  As I described these claims above, they are claims 
 
 18 See Johnson, supra note 4, at 1641 (“In particular, the notion of autonomy—especially 
structural or organizational autonomy—more fully captures the associational values at 
stake in Dale than does the bare idea of expressive association.”). 
 19 See David Cole, Hanging with the Wrong Crowd:  Of Gangs, Terrorists, and the Right of Associa-
tion, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 203, 205.  As Cole sees it, yoking association to speech “require[s] 
courts to engage in incoherent line-drawing,” because 
judges must ask whether associations are sufficiently “expressive” to warrant pro-
tection, and whether acts of association should be viewed as “association” or “con-
duct.”  But most, if not all, association is expressive to one degree or another, and 
one cannot distinguish conduct from association without reducing the right to a 
meaningless formality. 
  Id. 
 Cole, to be fair, also shares Shiffrin’s view that yoking association to speech discredits 
association because “[a]ssociation, no less than speech, plays a central role in both the 
political process and personal development, and deserves protection analogous to, but 
not limited to, that afforded speech.”  Id. at 206; see also Mazzone, supra note 17, at 646 
(“It requires judges to engage in the uncertain enterprise of determining, on an ad hoc 
basis, whether a particular organization’s specific message is undermined by a particular 
governmental regulation.  This approach, as widespread surprise with the Court’s Dale 
decision demonstrates, gives us few tools to determine or predict what types of govern-
mental regulations of what kinds of associations unduly infringe constitutional inter-
ests.”). 
 20 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Perils of Moderation:  The Case of the Boy Scouts, 
74 S. CAL. L. REV. 119, 120 (2000) (“The right outcome [in expressive association cases] 
should not depend on a delicate balance of what kinds of organizations counts as expres-
sive organizations under the First Amendment.  Rather, any proper decision must recog-
nize that the state has no interest in counteracting discrimination by private associations 
that do not possess monopoly power.  The fine-spun efforts to shoehorn freedom of asso-
ciation into some ill-defined expressive box will breed only pointless and arcane distinc-
tions.”). 
 21 The Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, prohibits a law partnership from discriminat-
ing on the basis of, among other things, sex.  Pub. L. No. 88-352 § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 255 
(1964).  That seems a clear limit on the partnership’s associational freedom, albeit one 
that most of us are comfortable with and that the Supreme Court has held does not vio-
late the partnership’s constitutional right of association.  See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 
467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984).  Likewise, the Supreme Court has held that a private school may 
not discriminate on the basis of race in its admission policy.  Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 
160, 168–72 (1976).  That too seems a clear limit on its freedom of association, even if it 
is a limit most of us regard as socially just and constitutionally permissible.  See Cole, supra 
note 19, at 204 (“[A]s a matter of social governance, the right [of association], if uncon-
tained, is something we cannot live with.”). 
 22 An expressive association claim might also exist, for example, where an organization is 
punished for the content of its speech.  See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) 
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by an organization that requiring it to accept someone as a member 
whom it would rather exclude would force it to send a message it 
does not want to send, namely that it is on board with that unwanted 
member’s expression.  The claims are made when an organization’s 
exclusionary preferences run into tension with a state’s antidiscrimi-
nation law and commitment to social equality.  I think it is safe to say 
that Boy Scouts of America v. Dale23 is the seminal case, or at least the 
one that is most familiar to students of the First Amendment.  The 
other landmark cases, in chronological order, are (1) Roberts v. United 
States Jaycees;24 (2) Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual 
Group of Boston;25 (3) Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional 
Rights, Inc. (“FAIR”);26 and (4) Christian Legal Society v. Martinez 
(“CLS”)27. 
 
(holding that a state college could not deny official recognition to a local chapter of Stu-
dents for a Democratic Society without justification); see also Gay Students Org. of the 
Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 660–61 (1st Cir. 1974) (holding that the University 
of New Hampshire could not deny certain privileges to a gay student group on account of 
its expression).  The right of expressive association is also implicated where an organiza-
tion is forced to disclose who its members are, see NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 
U.S. 449, 462 (1958), or where individuals are required by law to pay dues to an organiza-
tion that supports ideological activities, see Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 
233–34 (1977) (concerning non-unionized public school teachers). 
 23 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 24 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 25 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
 26 547 U.S. 47 (2006). 
 27 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).  CLS involved the Hastings College of Law’s policy for official 
recognition of student groups.  A lot has been written about the case, and I am going to 
steer clear of it in this Article because it is factually distinguishable from the predecessor 
cases in ways that are doctrinally significant. 
The policy at issue at Hastings was a so-called “all comers” policy.  It required any stu-
dent group that wished to receive official recognition from the law school—and the bene-
fits that come with that recognition—to welcome any other students, regardless of their 
status or beliefs.  Id. at 2979.  And this posed a problem for the Christian Legal Society.  
The group wanted Hastings’ official recognition, but it wanted to limit its membership to 
those who would sign a “Statement of Faith” affirming, among other things, that unre-
pentant homosexual conduct is immoral and that the Bible is the word of God.  Id. at 
2980.  It was of course free to limit its membership in that manner; it would just have to 
exist on its own, independent of Hastings’ recognition and support.  The complex overlay 
of the public university setting and the idiosyncrasies of the policy at issue led the Su-
preme Court to treat CLS, first and foremost, as a subsidization case, and to therefore de-
cide it in a way that departed significantly from the doctrinal course it charted in the ear-
lier cases.  For an excellent discussion of this departure—and a critique of it—see Erica 
Goldberg, Amending Christian Legal Society v. Martinez:  Protecting Expressive Association as 
an Independent Right in a Limited Public Forum, 16 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 129 (2011); see also 
Alan Brownstein & Vikram Amar, Reviewing Associational Freedom Claims in a Limited Public 
Forum:  An Extension of the Distinction Between Debate-Dampening and Debate-Distorting State Ac-
tion, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 505 (2011).  As both articles’ titles suggest, and as their re-
spective analyses explain, the CLS decision imported a forum analysis that was absent in 
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The basic framework for analyzing these claims, which was really 
crystallized by the Supreme Court in Dale, is as follows.  First, the or-
ganization must show that it engages in expressive association—that 
is, that it exists in part to disseminate a particular message.  Second, it 
must show that the state action at issue—for the purposes of this Arti-
cle, an antidiscrimination law—impairs in some significant way its 
ability to disseminate the particular message.  Third, the state interest 
reflected in the antidiscrimination law must be weighed against the 
burden on the organization’s expression.28 
III.  THE BIG THREE, PLUS ONE 
Above I identified Roberts, Hurley, Dale, FAIR, and CLS as the land-
mark expressive association cases—and explained why CLS is in many 
ways an outlier.  FAIR, too, is a bit of an outlier—it certainly broke no 
doctrinal ground—but it did involve a pure message attribution 
claim, and for that reason I include it here.  I now look at each case, 
hopefully not in boring depth, to cover the evolution of the expres-
sive association doctrine and to expose the way in which message at-
tribution claims are made.  I repeat, though, that not every expressive 
association claim makes or relies on a message attribution claim.  An 
organization can argue that an unwanted member will interfere with 
its expression without exactly arguing that the unwanted member’s 
views will be attributed to it.  This is a difference between Dale, in 
which the Boy Scouts did not want to be seen as approving of homo-
sexuality, and Roberts, in which the Jaycees simply did not want wom-
en’s interests or views to overtake those of men. 
 
the earlier expressive association cases, and by so doing conflated the Christian Legal So-
ciety’s free speech claims with its expressive association claim.  Not only that, but by im-
porting a limited public forum analysis, it was far more deferential to the associational lim-
itation than in the earlier cases.  See id. at 513–14 (“All the Court’s earlier freedom of 
association cases evaluating regulations directed at or burdening the ability to associate or 
maintain associational autonomy focused on associations operating on private property 
or in traditional public forums.  The Court rigorously reviewed restrictions on associa-
tional freedom in these circumstances and locations.”).  The point here is that it is very 
easy to read CLS as something other than an expressive association case in the line of Jay-
cees, Hurley, Dale, and FAIR.  It is for this reason that I will not say anything more about it. 
 28 See Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 442 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(citing Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 658–59 (2000)).  Pi Lambda Phi involved a 
fraternity that lost its status as a recognized student organization because of its alleged 
drug activity.  Id. at 438.  The Third Circuit held that it was not an expressive association, 
and that even assuming otherwise, the state action was based on the fraternity’s conduct 
rather than ideology, and therefore did not burden its expression in any way.  Id. 
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A. Roberts v. United States Jaycees 
By most accounts, the right of expressive association was first ar-
ticulated in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.29  At the time the case was 
tried and argued on appeal, regular membership in the Jaycees was 
open only to men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five.  
Women and older men could still join, but only as associate members 
with a kind of second-class status.30  When two local chapters in Min-
nesota disregarded the membership distinction to comply with Min-
nesota’s Human Rights Act and admitted women as full members, the 
Jaycees filed a lawsuit to have the Act declared unconstitutional so 
that it could revoke the chapters’ charters.31 
The Supreme Court first affirmed the connection between associ-
ation and speech:   
 An individual’s freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the gov-
ernment for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected 
from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in 
group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed . . . .  Conse-
quently, we have long understood as implicit in the right to engage in ac-
tivities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to asso-
ciate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, 
educational, religious, and cultural ends.32 
The Court also conceded that the Jaycees, as an organization, en-
gaged in protected speech, and that forcing it to accept members “it 
does not desire . . . may impair the ability of the original members to 
express only those views that brought them together.”33 
But that is as far as the Jaycees got.  The Court went on to hold 
that merely being forced to admit women as regular members would 
not “impede the organization’s ability to engage in these protected 
 
 29 See, e.g., Shawn M. Larsen, Note, For Blacks Only:  The Associational Freedoms of Private Minor-
ity Clubs, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 359, 366–67 (1999) (highlighting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees as 
the first in a trilogy of cases).  But see John D. Inazu, The Strange Origins of the Constitutional 
Right of Association, 77 TENN. L. REV. 485, 486 (2010) (“But neither the right of association 
nor its doctrinal problems began with Roberts, as the Court first recognized a constitution-
al right of association just over fifty years ago in its 1958 decision, NAACP v. Alabama ex 
rel. Patterson.”).  Inuza may well have a point.  The Supreme Court did recognize in Patter-
son that “[i]t is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement 
of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”  NAACP v. 
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).  David McGowan traces expressive as-
sociation to yet another case, United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).  McGowan, 
supra note 15, at 126. 
 30 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 613 (1984). 
 31 Id. at 615–17.  The history provided above is somewhat abbreviated. 
 32 Id. at 622. 
 33 Id. at 623. 
1468  JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:5 
 
activities or to disseminate its preferred views.”34  Indeed, it could 
continue to promote the interests of young men and exclude anyone 
with an incompatible ideology; it just could not categorically bar 
women from regular membership on the assumption that admitting 
them would “change the content or impact of the organization’s 
speech”—at least “[i]n the absence of a showing far more substantial 
than that attempted by the Jaycees.”35 
Two features of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Roberts are worth 
highlighting.  First, the Jaycees actually got a bench trial in the Dis-
trict of Minnesota, and before that a full hearing before the Minneso-
ta Human Rights Department.  That is important.  It means that the 
Supreme Court did not just speculate, in the abstract, that admitting 
women would not interfere with expression.  It held that there was no 
basis in the record for the Jaycees’ claim that it would. 
Second, while the Supreme Court identified in rather broad terms 
a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in First Amendment 
activity,36 the Court made it equally clear that the right is not abso-
lute.37  For the right to be infringed, the Jaycees had to show more 
than that it engaged in speech in some general sense.  The Court 
agreed that it did at least that.38  But the Jaycees had to further 
demonstrate that the message it wanted to send—or not send—
required the exclusion of women from the ranks of regular members, 
and this is where it came up short in the Court’s eyes.39 
 
 34 Id. at 627. 
 35 Id. at 628. 
 36 Id. at 618 (“[T]he Court has recognized a right to associate for the purpose of engaging 
in those activities protected by the First Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the 
redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.  The Constitution guarantees freedom 
of association of this kind as an indispensable means of preserving other individual liber-
ties.”). 
 37 Id. at 623 (“The right to associate for expressive purposes is not, however, absolute.  In-
fringements on that right may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling 
state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through 
means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.”). 
 38 Id. at 626–27 (“To be sure, as the Court of Appeals noted, a ‘not insubstantial part’ of the 
Jaycees’ activities constitutes protected expression on political, economic, cultural, and 
social affairs.” (quoting U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1570 (8th Cir. 1983)). 
 39 At oral argument, the Jaycees’ lawyer’s recurring argument was that the character of the 
organization, and namely its commitment to the interests of young men, would be fun-
damentally altered if it had to accept women on equal terms.  See Transcript of Oral Ar-
gument at 13,  Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (No. 83-724), available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_83_724.; id. at 18 (“I think an organi-
zation in which you change the membership from one which is all men, dedicated to the 
voting interests of men, and you change it to an organization which also includes women, 
I think it’s only rational to assume that organization is going to undergo a substantial 
change.”).  But at least one Justice (unindentified in transcript) was quick to ask where 
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The Eighth Circuit saw it differently below, and it is worth looking 
at its reasoning.  Like the Supreme Court, it agreed that the Jaycees 
engaged in protected speech.40  And it went to some trouble to identi-
fy particular positions the organization had taken over the years:  The 
record contains many examples of this political and ideological activi-
ty.  We mention only a representative selection. 
These resolutions supported a balanced budget, a fund drive to fight 
muscular dystrophy and juvenile diabetes, legislation to permit “voluntary 
prayer in American schools,” and the economic development of Alaska.  
All of these positions, except the second one, relate to highly controver-
sial political questions. . . . 
  Over the years, the national organization has taken stands in favor of 
the draft, the efforts of the FBI “to eliminate disloyalty” in this country 
before World War II, the formation of the United Nations, an increase in 
the corporate income tax, the recommendations of the Hoover Commis-
sion on reorganization of the federal government, the ratification of the 
Panama Canal treaty, the 18-year-old vote, the vote for citizens of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, the “defense of freedom” in Vietnam, and (apparently 
at a later time) the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Southeast Asia.  It has 
opposed “one-man” congressional committees, “socialized medicine,” 
 
the expressive activity occurred, and drew a distinction between an organization that 
simply wanted to limit its membership to men and one in which that very limitation 
helped it realize some expressive goal: 
If you have an organization of all male stockbrokers that are solely concerned with 
the business of stockbrokering and what’s happening to stockbrokering, and 
they’re required to take in women stockbrokers, it seems to me that the great fo-
cus on stockbrokering may be very little different between men and women.  On 
the other hand, if you have an organization of male chauvinists that says we’re 
tired of this affirmative action in favor of women, we want what we think is a 
square deal, it seems to me there you get a different thing.  But you haven’t really 
shown that the Jaycees are in the latter category at all, that they espouse anything 
close to men’s rights of the kinds of issues that men and women might feel differ-
ently about. 
  Id.  Indeed, another Justice (also unidentified by transcript) said it would be a very differ-
ent case “where there was something called the National Organization of Men, that is an-
ti-affirmative action, anti-ERA, and so forth.”  Id. at 21.  There, quite conceivably, the 
forced inclusion of women could compromise the organization’s expressive agenda.  
Where the Jaycees’ lawyer did point to specific positions the organization had taken in 
the past, by his own admission those positions did not promote the interests of young 
men as distinguished from young women.  Id. at 19.  The only issues he did identified 
where men and women might have distinct and divergent perspectives—the ERA, the 
draft, and abortion—were ones on which the organization had not ever taken a position. 
See id. at 15 (“I can’t think of a public commitment issue which is applied only to men, 
but I can foresee that the organization itself, if they take a vote on ERA or the draft or 
abortion, or any of those sensitive issues, they could very well take a different position.”). 
 40 See McClure, 709 F.2d at 1570 (“We conclude that a good deal of what the plaintiff does 
indisputably comes within the right of association, even as limited to association in pursu-
ance of the specific ends of speech, writing, belief, and assembly for redress of grievanc-
es.”). 
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federal funds for teachers’ salaries and school construction, and pornog-
raphy.41 
The Eighth Circuit could not, however, locate a single, identifia-
ble message with which the regular admission of women would inter-
fere.  The Court thought that “[i]f the [Minnesota Human rights 
Act] is upheld, the basic purpose of the Jaycees will change” and that 
“some change in the Jaycees’ philosophical cast can reasonably be 
expected.”42  But even then the Court had to admit that “the specific 
content of most of the resolutions adopted over the years by the Jay-
cees has nothing to do with sex.”43  Why then did it rule in favor of 
the Jaycees?  Because it believed that the potential shift in purpose 
was enough to compromise the Jaycees’ expressive agenda: 
The regulation at issue here, though not overly related to the content of 
what the Jaycees are saying, nevertheless has the potential of changing 
that content, because it purports to specify, in one respect at least, the 
identity of those why may be Jaycees, and who therefore determine the 
content of what Jaycees say.44 
The Supreme Court obviously disagreed, in part because the 
character of an organization is not entitled to the same degree of 
First Amendment protection as some clear and identifiable message it 
wishes to send, and in part because such a view relies on stereotypical 
assumptions about how men’s interests and views differ from those of 
women. 
B.  Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of 
Boston 
Hurley, like Roberts, involved an organization whose exclusionary 
preferences were at odds with a state’s public accommodations law.  
The organization was a parade—the annual St. Patrick’s Day and 
Evacuation Day parade in Boston—put on by the South Boston Allied 
War Veterans Council.  The group it wished to exclude was the Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, or GLIB.  To 
be clear, the Veterans Council did not want to keep all gays out of the 
parade; it simply did not want GLIB to march as its own parade unit.  
Its argument was that excluding GLIB formalized its commitment to 
traditional religious and social values.45 
 
 41 Id. at 1569–70. 
 42 Id. at 1571. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 1576. 
 45 Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos. v. Boston, No. 921518, 1993 WL 818674, 
at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 15, 1993). 
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In the Superior Court of Massachusetts, which held a bench trial, 
Hurley was treated as an expressive association case, and one that 
called for the rather straightforward application of Roberts.  As the 
court put it, “The Veterans argue that their Parade is a form of 
speech protected by the First Amendment via the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and that their speech will be effectively diluted or dis-
torted if they are required to include GLIB in their Parade.”46  It fell 
on the Veterans Council, then, to identify some message it wished to 
convey with which the inclusion of GLIB would interfere.  The Veter-
an’s Council could not do that to the court’s satisfaction.  The court 
could not look past how wildly diverse and eclectic, and in some in-
stances how oppositional, the parade’s other participants were.  In 
light of the Veterans Council’s seeming preference for heterogeneity 
and low barrier to parade entry, the court found it “impossible to dis-
cern any specific expressive purpose entitling the Parade to protec-
tion under the First Amendment.”47 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, but the Su-
preme Court reversed.  One of the more striking features of the 
Court’s opinion is that it did not treat the case, as the Massachusetts 
Superior Court did, as an expressive association case.  In the substan-
tive portion of its analysis, it cited Roberts only twice for inconsequen-
tial points, and it referenced the expressive association right only 
once in its discussion of another case.  Instead, it relied on its earlier 
compelled speech cases—cases involving, for example, the require-
ment that children in public schools salute and pledge allegiance to 
the American flag;48 the requirement that newspapers allow those 
running for public office to respond to editorial criticism;49 and the 
requirement that a public utility grant space in a newsletter accom-
panying its monthly bills to a third party’s advocacy.50  Framed as a 
compelled speech case, the Court was less interested in the Veterans 
Council’s identification of some discrete message it wished to send 
that GLIB’s presence in the parade would compromise, and more in-
terested in whether requiring the Council to include GLIB would 
force it to support or convey a message with which it did not agree.  
In fact, in some way it dismissed that first question as immaterial, 
finding that a coherent, particularized message was not a prerequisite 
 
 46 Id. at *12. 
 47 Id. at *13. 
 48 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 49 Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
 50 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986). 
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of constitutional protection.51  The point was not what the Veterans 
Council wanted to say, but what it did not want to say or be perceived 
as saying.52  Parades are an expressive activity, and as the Court put it, 
“the Council clearly decided to exclude a message it did not like from 
the communication it chose to make, and that is enough to invoke its 
right as a private speaker to shape its expression by speaking on one 
subject while remaining silent on another.”53  At a minimum, it rea-
soned, the presence of GLIB in the parade would communicate the 
fact that some Irish are gay and the view that they are entitled to the 
same level of social acceptance as heterosexuals.54 
And not only that—here comes the message attribution claim—
but observers would assume this communication had the Veterans 
Council’s support:  “GLIB’s participation would likely be perceived as 
having resulted from the Council’s customary determination about a 
unit admitted to the parade, that its message was worthy of presenta-
tion and quite possibly of support as well.”55  The nature of a parade 
made this inevitable: 
[T]he parade does not consist of individual, unrelated segments that 
happen to be transmitted together for individual selection by members 
of the audience.  Although each parade unit generally identifies itself, 
each is understood to contribute something to a common theme, and 
accordingly there is no customary practice whereby private sponsors disa-
vow “any identity of viewpoint” between themselves and the selected par-
ticipants.56 
For the Court, then, Hurley appeared to be a rather easy case.  The 
Veterans Council had a First Amendment right not to promote 
GLIB’s point of view:  “Thus, when dissemination of a view contrary 
to one’s own is forced upon a speaker intimately connected with the 
communication advanced, the speaker’s right to autonomy over the 
message is compromised.”57  The determinative principle was the 
primacy of speaker autonomy. 
 
 51 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569–70 (1995) 
(“But a private speaker does not forfeit constitutional protection simply by combining 
multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes to isolate an exact message as the 
exclusive subject matter of the speech.”). 
 52 Id. at 573. 
 53 Id. at 574. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 575. 
 56 Id. at 576. 
 57 Id. 
May 2013] EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION DOCTRINE 1473 
 
C.  Boy Scouts of America v. Dale 
Roberts may be the foundational expressive association case, but 
Dale, it is probably safe to say, carries the most enduring significance.  
It is certainly the case with which most non-scholars are familiar, and 
it is the case on which most scholars’ opinions are the fiercest—and 
most fiercely divided.  To some, the Supreme Court got it exactly 
right,58 and to others the Court shamefully derailed expressive associ-
ation doctrine.59  Regardless of who is right on that question, it is 
probably true that Dale “marks the end of the Roberts era.”60 
The facts of Dale begin with James Dale becoming a Cub Scout at 
age eight and many years later achieving the position of assistant 
scoutmaster of a New Jersey troop.61  Around that time, he left for col-
lege at Rutgers, where he came out as gay.62  And for that, the Boy 
Scouts revoked his adult membership, explaining that it “specifically 
forbid[s] membership to homosexuals.”63  Dale sued under New Jer-
sey’s public accommodations statute, which prohibited discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public accommo-
dation.64 
The case was never tried.  The New Jersey Superior Court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the Boy Scouts, holding, among other 
things, that the Boy Scouts had a clear position on homosexuality and 
that the First Amendment prevented New Jersey from forcing the or-
ganization to accept Dale.65  The New Jersey Supreme Court went the 
other way, first, refusing to accept that it was truly important to the 
Boy Scouts to take a stand against homosexuality and, second, disput-
ing that Dale’s inclusion would stand in the way of its other various 
purposes.66  Addressing Hurley, the Court denied that including Dale 
would force the Boy Scouts to express any message with respect to 
homosexuality.67  The Supreme Court’s holding in Roberts shines 
 
 58 See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Scouts, Families, and Schools, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1917, 1917 
(2001) (calling Dale one of “[t]he three most significant, rightly-decided cases of the Su-
preme Court’s 1999 Term,” in which “[f]reedom won but, shockingly, just barely”). 
 59 See generally ANDREW KOPPELMAN & TOBIAS BARRINGTON WOLFF, A RIGHT TO 
DISCRIMINATE?  HOW THE CASE OF BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA V. DALE WARPED THE LAW OF 
FREE ASSOCIATION (2009). 
 60 David Bernstein, The Right of Expressive Association and Private Universities’ Racial Preferences 
and Speech Codes, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 619, 623–25 (2001). 
 61  Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000). 
 62 Id. at 644–45. 
 63 Id. at 645. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 645–46. 
 66 Id. at 647. 
 67 Id. 
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through in the New Jersey Supreme Court’s analysis; to that court, 
the Boy Scouts could not credibly identify a discrete and coherent 
message it wished to convey, and with which Dale’s mere presence in 
the organization would interfere. 
The Supreme Court reversed, and if anything stands out in the 
Court’s opinion it is its deference to the Boy Scouts’ assertions that it 
does not approve of homosexuality and that Dale’s presence would 
send a contrary message—hence the sense that Dale marked the end 
of the Roberts era.  But the opinion starts out ordinary enough.  The 
Court cited Roberts for the broad principle that implicit in the pano-
ply of First Amendment rights is a corresponding right to associate 
with others for a wide range of purposes.  It recognized, corollary to 
this principle, that forcing a group to accept certain members may 
impair its expressive tone and range, and that “[t]he forced inclusion 
of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group’s freedom of 
expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a signif-
icant way the group’s ability to advocate public or private view-
points.”68  And finally, the Court acknowledged, probably uncontro-
versially, that the Boy Scouts seeks to instill values in young people 
and therefore engages in expressive activity.69 
It is at this point that the opinion takes a turn that is highly defer-
ential to the Boy Scouts’ own assertions—and that most critics think 
the Court lost its jurisprudential way.  The Court conceded that nei-
ther the Scout Oath nor the Scout Law mentioned sexual orientation.  
In the Oath, scouts pledge to do their best to keep themselves “mor-
ally straight,” and the Law states that a scout must be “clean,” but 
those terms, the Court admitted, “are by no means self-defining.”70  
That did not matter, however, in the final analysis:   
The Boy Scouts asserts that it teaches that homosexual conduct is not 
morally straight, and that it does not want to promote homosexual con-
duct as a legitimate form of behavior.  We accept the Boy Scouts’ asser-
tion.  We need not inquire further to determine the nature of the Boy 
Scouts’ expression with respect to homosexuality.71 
 
 68 Id. at 648 (citing N.Y. State Club Ass’n., Inc. v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988). 
 69 Id. at 649–50. 
 70 Id. at 650. 
 71 Id. at 651 (internal quotation marks omitted).  To be fair, it was not just a matter of taking 
the Boy Scouts at its word.  The record before the Court contained some written evidence 
of the Boy Scouts’ viewpoint.  For example, a 1978 position statement from the Executive 
Committee contained the following remark by the President:  “We do not believe that 
homosexuality and leadership in Scouting are appropriate.  We will continue to select on-
ly those who in our judgment meet our standards and qualifications for leadership.”  Id. 
at 652.  The most recent position statement in the record maintained, 
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Having accepted that the Boy Scouts is an expressive organization, 
and that at the organizational level it has a view of homosexuality, the 
Court then turned to the final link in the analytical chain:  whether 
the forced inclusion of Dale as a scoutmaster would burden the 
Scouts’ expression.  Again, the Court’s deference gave the Scouts a 
massive advantage in the constitutional analysis.  “As we give defer-
ence to an association’s assertions regarding the nature of its expres-
sion, we must also give deference to an association’s view of what 
would impair its expression.”72  The simple fact that Dale was openly 
gay, a leader in his community, and a gay rights activist was enough 
for the Court.  “Dale’s presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the very 
least, force the organization to send a message, both to the youth 
members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual 
conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.”73  This is a message attribu-
tion claim. 
For support, the Court analogized only to Hurley, holding that just 
as GLIB’s presence in the St. Patrick’s Day parade would have inter-
fered with the organizer’s choice not to promote a particular point of 
view, Dale’s presence in the Boy Scouts would interfere with the or-
ganization’s choice not to promote a view of homosexuality contrary 
to its own.74  It did not matter to the Court that the Boy Scouts was 
not in the business of speaking out loud and clear against homosexu-
ality, or that it tolerated dissent on the moral standing of homosexu-
als and their rightful place in the Scout ranks.  The critical point was 
that “[t]he presence of an avowed homosexual and gay rights activ-
ist . . . sends a distinctly different message from the presence of a het-
erosexual assistant scoutmaster who is on record as disagreeing with 
Boy Scouts policy.”75 
Justice Stevens wrote the dissent in Dale.  He took the majority to 
task in a number of thoughtful ways, and the substance of his critique 
is captured perfectly in the following two sentences: 
But we must inquire whether the group is, in fact, expressing a message 
(whatever it may be) and whether that message (if one is expressed) is 
significantly affected by a State’s antidiscrimination law.  More critically, 
 
The Boy Scouts of America has always reflected the expectations that Scouting 
families have had for the organization.  We do not believe that homosexuals pro-
vide a role model consistent with these expectations.  Accordingly, we do not allow 
for the registration of avowed homosexuals as members or as leaders of the BSA. 
  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 72 Id. at 653. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 654. 
 75 Id. at 655–56. 
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that inquiry requires our independent analysis, rather than deference to a 
group’s litigating posture.76 
Justice Stevens drilled the majority, hard, on both questions.  First, 
giving the evidence a far more searching inspection than the majority 
did, he called into serious question the credibility of the Boy Scouts’ 
claim that it took a clear and unequivocal view of homosexuality, the 
only kind of view, in Justice Stevens’ mind, entitled to protection of 
the First Amendment.77  Assuming it did take such a view, Justice Ste-
vens went on to question “whether the mere inclusion of homosexu-
als would actually force BSA to proclaim a message it does not want to 
send.”78  Stevens thereby engaged the message attribution claim.  
Here, he distinguished Hurley as a case in which the plaintiff wished 
to convey a particular message through the defendant association, 
and the plaintiff’s message would likely be perceived as the defend-
ant’s own.79  The only message from which the Boy Scouts could wish 
to disassociate, by contrast, was that sent by Dale’s mere presence in 
the organization.80 
This brought Justice Stevens to the second question—whether the 
Boy Scouts’ professed message would be compromised by Dale’s in-
clusion.  He refused to accept that it would:  “[Dale’s] participation 
sends no cognizable message to the Scouts or to the world.  Unlike 
GLIB, Dale did not carry a banner or a sign; he did not distribute any 
factsheet; and he expressed no intent to send any message.”81  Not on-
ly that, but the Boy Scouts is an enormous organization, and the no-
tion that it “implicitly endorses the views that each of [its members] 
may express in a non-Scouting context is simply mind boggling.”82  As 
Justice Stevens saw it, a man who happened to be homosexual could 
participate in scouting, even be a scoutmaster, without the Boy Scouts 
itself being put in the allegedly uncomfortable position of either 
condoning his homosexuality or being seen as condoning his homo-
sexuality.  To him, the Boy Scouts’ message attribution claim was fan-
ciful. 
 
 76 Id. at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 77 Id. at 666–78, 682–86. 
 78 Id. at 689. 
 79 Id. at 694. 
 80 Id. at 695. 
 81 Id. at 694–95. 
 82 Id. at 697. 
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D.  Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. 
FAIR was, at least for the Supreme Court, an easy case.  In a unan-
imous opinion, it upheld the Solomon Amendment, which essential-
ly requires universities, as a condition of receiving certain federal 
funds, to provide the same access to military recruiters that they pro-
vide to other recruiters.83  At the time, this was something many law 
schools were loathe to do because of their disagreement with the mil-
itary’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy.  In fact, the schools had non-
discrimination policies of their own that any recruiters seeking access 
were required to observe, and that the military stood in clear viola-
tion of.84 
And so FAIR, an association of law schools and law faculties, sued 
Donald Rumsfeld, then the Secretary of Defense, under the First 
Amendment.85  It argued (1) that the Solomon Amendment com-
pelled speech on the law schools’ part, by forcing them to assist the 
recruiters in meeting with students and by forcing them to host the 
message communicated by the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy; (2) 
that the law schools’ treatment of the military recruiters was itself 
protected symbolic speech; and (3) that effectively being forced to 
accommodate the military violated the law schools’ right of expressive 
association.86 
In just a few words, the Court rejected the expressive association 
claim that the military’s compelled presence on the law schools’ 
campuses would interfere with or undermine their message that dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation is wrong.  The law 
schools—probably with considerable reluctance—invoked Dale, and 
the Court got around it by distinguishing between a scoutmaster who 
is a full member of the plaintiff organization and recruiters who are 
“by definition, outsiders who come onto campus for the limited pur-
pose of trying to hire students—not to become members of the 
school’s expressive association.”87  In other words, nobody would as-
sume that the military recruiters spoke for the law schools, or that the 
law schools’ mere accommodation of military recruiters signaled a fa-
vorable or accepting view of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell.”  This was a firm 
rejection of a message attribution claim.  And, anyway, the law 
 
 83 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2006). 
 84 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 (2006). 
 85 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269 (D.N.J. 
2003). 
 86 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. at 60–61. 
 87 Id. at 69. 
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schools remained perfectly free to speak out against the military’s 
policy:  “Students and faculty are free to associate to voice their dis-
approval of the military’s message.”88  That was all the Court had to 
say. 
The district court below was more thorough in its discussion but 
came out exactly where the Supreme Court did.89  First, it found there 
was no realistic threat that the law schools’ opposition to discrimina-
tion would be muddled by the periodic visits of military recruiters, 
especially considering the law schools’ continuing freedom “to pro-
claim their message of diversity and tolerance as they see fit, to coun-
teract and indeed overwhelm the message of discrimination which 
they feel is inherent in the views of the military recruiters.”90  It did 
not matter to the court that some students lost faith in the law 
schools’ message of tolerance; the law schools were still able to dis-
seminate it “loudly and clearly.”91 
Turning to Hurley and the law schools’ related compelled speech 
claim that they were being forced to host a contrary message, the 
court refused to analogize participation in a parade, an inherently 
and chiefly expressive activity, to recruiting, the purpose of which it 
saw as chiefly economic and functional.92  GLIB, after all, wanted to 
be included in the St. Patrick’s Day Parade to disseminate a particular 
message, and in no sense were the military recruiters “seeking access 
to campuses and students with the primary purpose of expressing the 
message that disapproval of openly gay conduct within the armed 
forces is morally correct or justifiable.”93  And finally, the court reject-
ed the law schools’ claim that they were being forced to actually en-
dorse a message which they abhorred.  “Facilitating interviews and 
even disseminating recruiting literature on behalf of military recruit-
 
 88 Id. at 69–70. 
 89 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 303–10. 
 90 Id. at 305. 
 91 Id. at 306. 
 92 The Supreme Court embedded this point in its discussion of FAIR’s compelled speech 
claim rather than its expressive association claim.  See Forum for Academic & Institutional 
Rights, 547 U.S. at 64 (“In this case, accommodating the military’s message does not affect 
the law schools’ speech, because the schools are not speaking when they host interviews 
and recruiting receptions.”).  This point, to be fair, is vulnerable to the criticism that it 
construes the purpose of a recruiting event far too narrowly.  See Case Note, Freedom of Ex-
pressive Association—Campus Access for Military Recruiters, 120 HARV. L. REV. 253, 262 (2006) 
(“Specifically, treating law schools as mere vocational institutions denies their inevitably 
political character; inculcates a passive approach to the law; and robs law schools of their 
potential to become dynamic and beneficial shapers of coming generations of legal prac-
titioners and, with time, of the law.”). 
 93 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 307. 
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ers, when a law school does all these things for every other potential 
employer in the context of a large recruiting function, are not obvi-
ous endorsements of a particular ideological point of view.”94  This is 
particularly true, again, considering that the law schools were not lim-
ited in their ability to disclaim any contrary message communicated 
by the military recruiters. 
E.  Summary 
Roberts, Hurley, Dale, and FAIR comprise a lineage of cases in which 
the Supreme Court took a message-based approach to expressive as-
sociation claims.  They are not the only cases, but certainly the im-
portant ones.95 
That approach, as we have seen, asks three questions.  First, does 
the organization making the claim actually engage in expression?  
Second, assuming it does, would requiring it to accept unwanted 
members impair that expression?  The second question encompasses 
a message attribution claim; it is a particular kind or mechanism of 
impairment caused by unwanted members’ views being seen as the 
views of the organization.  Third, and seemingly less significant in the 
caselaw, is the state’s interest in equality nonetheless so important 
that the burden on the expressive association right is warranted?  It 
was not until Dale that this question became an explicit prong of the 
analysis,96 and one of the more forceful criticisms of Dale is that the 
 
 94 Id. at 310. 
 95 See N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1, 8 (1988) (upholding New York City’s 
Human Rights Law, which prohibited discrimination by certain clubs, against a First 
Amendment expressive association challenge); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club 
of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987) (holding that requiring California Rotary Clubs to 
admit women did not violate First Amendment rights of organization). 
 96 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000) (“Having determined that the Boy 
Scouts is an expressive association and that the forced inclusion of Dale would significant-
ly affect its expression, we inquire whether the application of New Jersey’s public accom-
modations law to require that the Boy Scouts accept Dale as an assistant scoutmaster runs 
afoul of the Scouts’ freedom of expressive association.”).  The district court in FAIR also 
found in Dale—not, it suggested, in the earlier cases—“a three-step process to analyze a 
group’s expressive association claim.”  Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 291 F. 
Supp. 2d at 303. 
In fairness, the Supreme Court in Roberts did incorporate this point into its analysis, 
but because it had already determined that the Jaycees message would not be compro-
mised by the presence of women, it comes off as more of an afterthought in the Court’s 
discussion.  See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (“In any event, even if 
enforcement of the Act causes some incidental abridgement of the Jaycees’ protected 
speech, that effect is no greater than is necessary to accomplish the State’s legitimate 
purposes.”); see also id. at 623 (“Infringements on [the right to associate for expressive 
purposes] may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, un-
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Court basically punted on it, or at least failed to take it very serious-
ly.97 
The plaintiff in Roberts failed on the second question; it was not 
able to articulate how admitting women as full members would com-
promise its expressive agenda.98  The plaintiff in Hurley prevailed on 
both questions; its parade was an expressive event, and accommodat-
ing an unwanted message would modify the character of that expres-
sion.99  The plaintiff in Dale, too, prevailed on both questions:  the 
Boy Scouts was engaged in the instillation of values—that is expres-
sion—and the presence of a gay scoutmaster would complicate its ef-
forts.100  The plaintiffs in FAIR failed on both questions; recruiting 
events are not so much expressive activities, and it would not matter if 
they were, because the presence of military recruiters would not 
compromise in any way the law schools’ professed commitment to 
tolerance and nondiscrimination.101 
What about message attribution claims in these cases?  There was 
not much of one in Roberts.  The Jaycees’ claim, rather, was that the 
organization was committed to promoting the interests of young 
men, and if women became full members that commitment would 
shift.102  In Hurley, the Court accepted the message attribution claim 
that the Veterans Council would be seen as endorsing GLIB’s mes-
sage that its constituency merited recognition and support, but the 
opinion turned more on a logically separate compelled speech claim 
that focused on speaker autonomy.103  Dale and FAIR implicated ra-
ther pure message attribution claims.  The Supreme Court held in 
 
related to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly 
less restrictive of associational freedoms.”).  In Hurley, too, the Court considered Massa-
chusetts’s interest in preventing the denial of access to public accommodations on the 
basis of someone’s sexual orientation, but because the parade sought to exclude only a 
message rather than homosexuals per se, it regarded the application of the statute in 
question as a wholly unjustified interference with speech.  Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbi-
an & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 578–81 (1995).  For a critique of this distinc-
tion, see Tobias Barrington Wolff, Compelled Affirmations, Free Speech, and the U.S. Military’s 
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Policy, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1141, 1191 n.150 (1997) (arguing that the 
“space that this distinction carves out is a very small one ”). 
 97 See Andrew Koppelman, Should Noncommercial Associations Have An Absolute Right to Discrim-
inate?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 27 (2004) (criticizing Dale because “it seemed to 
hold that substantial burdens were per se unconstitutional, rather than merely subject to 
strict scrutiny.  In effect, any plaintiff’s claim was so powerful that all antidiscrimination 
laws were unconstitutional in all their applications.”). 
 98 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627–28 
 99 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 547–76. 
100 Dale, 530 U.S. at 651–56. 
101 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 64–70 (2006). 
102 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627–28. 
103 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574–75. 
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Dale that the Boy Scouts would be seen as endorsing homosexuality 
simply by allowing a homosexual to be a scoutmaster, while it held in 
FAIR that nobody would attribute to the law schools the military’s dis-
criminatory view of homosexuals manifested in “Don’t Ask Don’t 
Tell.”104 
IV.  PROBLEMATIZING EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION, PARTICULARLY DALE 
The three elements of an expressive association claim are also 
pressure points for critics.  Critics of Dale, for example, could argue 
that the Boy Scouts really had no critical, discernible message respect-
ing homosexuality to disseminate, or that Dale’s mere identification 
as gay would not get in the way of any such message, or that the pri-
vate and social harms of discrimination are simply too important to 
suffer the override of a group’s discrimination.  And as it happens, all 
critiques of Dale, in one way or another, make these points.105  I want 
to survey them here, but they usually fall into two categories. 
The first category, and probably the more familiar, attacks the Su-
preme Court for its astounding level of deference to the Boy Scouts’ 
claim of what its message was with respect to homosexuality and what 
would impair that message.  Over fifteen years before Dale was decid-
ed, in Roberts, the Supreme Court articulated a seemingly workable 
“message-based” approach to an organization’s claim for immunity 
from antidiscrimination laws on free speech grounds:  If an organiza-
tion is expressive in nature; and if the acceptance of an unwanted 
member would distort its expression; and if the burden on expression 
is not outweighed by the government interest in nondiscrimination, 
the organization has a First Amendment right to discriminate against 
and turn away the unwanted member.  But the majority opinion in 
Dale, rather than asking the ifs, instead just took the Boy Scouts’ 
word.  And as a result, it appeared to give any organization an easy 
out from antidiscrimination law, as well as any other regulation that 
conflicted with its values. 
The second category, which has more of a critical theory ring to it, 
asks not what the Boy Scouts’ message really was, or what would im-
 
104 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. at 64–65; Dale, 530 U.S. at 653. 
105 For a general critique that traverses all three points, see Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine 
Fisk, The Expressive Interest of Associations, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 595 (2001) (arguing 
that the Boy Scouts’ so-called opposition to homosexuality was really just a litigation pos-
ture, that Dale advocated no particular view of homosexuality, that the Boy Scouts re-
mained free to advocate their own view even in his presence, and that the elimination of 
discrimination is a compelling enough public interest that it ought to override the ex-
pressive interest of the Boy Scouts). 
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pair it, but questions the analytically prior point of whether Dale ex-
pressed some contrary viewpoint merely by identifying as a homosex-
ual.  The literature on this point gets into more abstract issues like 
the social significance or cultural evaluation of gay identity. 
As I said above, my aim here is not to discuss these critiques in de-
tail, much less to take them on.  They are all sensible critiques.  My 
aim, rather, is to show that there is still room for my critique of Dale, 
the expressive association doctrine, and message attribution claims in 
particular. 
A.  Unjustified Deference 
Probably the most fair critique of Dale is that the Supreme Court 
was entirely too deferential to the Boy Scouts’ claim that it did in fact 
disapprove of homosexuality and that Dale’s mere presence in the 
organization would limit its ability to communicate that message.  
Maybe it is useful here to return to Roberts, and particularly the Su-
preme Court’s holding that it would not find the potential for mes-
sage dilution “[i]n the absence of a showing far more substantial than 
that attempted by the Jaycees.”106  In New York State Club Ass’n, too, the 
Court recognized “that an association might be able to show that it is 
organized for specific expressive purposes and that it will not be able 
to advocate its desired viewpoints nearly as effectively if it cannot con-
fine its membership.”107  There was virtually no showing in Dale, but ra-
ther the assertion of a position in litigation.  The Court even said that 
“[a]s we give deference to an association’s assertions regarding the 
nature of its expression, we must also give deference to an associa-
tion’s view of what would impair its expression.”108  Even those who 
are pleased by the outcome in Dale are willing to admit that the opin-
ion was soft on reasoning here.109 
This first critique comes out, obviously, in Justice Stevens’s spirit-
ed dissent in Dale, and in particular his statement that  
[i]f this Court were to defer to whatever position an organization is pre-
pared to assert in its briefs, there would be no way to mark the proper 
boundary between genuine exercises of the right to associate, on the one 
 
106 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628 (emphasis added). 
107 N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988) (emphasis added). 
108 Dale, 530 U.S. at 653. 
109 See Johnson, supra note 4, at 1641 (contending that “the Dale Court set the bar in approx-
imately the right place” but that “the Court’s opinion is a bit cursory on supportive rea-
soning”). 
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hand, and sham claims that are simply attempts to insulate nonexpressive 
private discrimination, on the other hand.110 
Justice Souter, too, took the majority opinion in Dale to task for essen-
tially converting an expressive association claim into “an easy trump 
of any antidiscrimination law.”111 
And following Stevens’s lead, one of the more robust academic 
critiques comes from Andrew Koppelman and Tobias Barrington 
Wolff.112  Koppelman and Wolff have no problem in theory with a 
message-based approach that looks to (1) the nature of the expressive 
practice at issue; (2) whether compelled association will undermine 
that practice; and (3) whether the organization’s interest in expres-
sion is sufficiently great to outweigh the public interest in nondis-
crimination. 
Their grievance, rather, is that the Supreme Court was entirely too 
deferential to the Boy Scouts on (1) and (2), and that it made no se-
rious effort to consider (3).113  As a result, the Court gifted to future 
organizations an argument for discriminating against unwanted 
members that really admits of no limiting principle.  If, after all, a 
court must defer to an organization’s view of what its message is, as 
well as its view of what would impair its message, “[i]t follows that an 
expressive association claim is available to any entity that wants to dis-
criminate at any time for any purpose.”114  In other words, the defer-
ence requirements the Supreme Court instituted “are not just proce-
dural provisos that shift the burden of establishing certain facts.  
They tilt the balance so radically as to transform the underlying 
law.”115 
It is true, to be fair, that the majority opinion in Dale denied “that 
an expressive association can erect a shield against antidiscrimination 
laws simply by asserting that mere acceptance of a member from a 
particular group would impair its message.”116  But as Koppelman and 
 
110 Dale, 530 U.S. at 687  (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
111 Id. at 701–02 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
112 See KOPPELMAN & WOLFF, supra note 59, at 25–42 (arguing that the Court’s deference in 
the ruling produces bizarre results). 
113 Id. at 28, 31–34, 38–39.  For a similar critique, see Bernstein, supra note 60, at 624 
(“Moreover, despite lip service paid to Roberts and its weak compelling interest test, nei-
ther the majority opinion nor the dissent discussed whether the government has a com-
pelling interest in eradicating discrimination against homosexuals.”); see also Taylor 
Flynn, Don’t Ask Us to Explain Ourselves, Don’t Tell Us What to Do:  The Boy Scouts’ Exclusion 
of Gay Members and the Necessity of Independent Judicial Review, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 87 
(2001) (claiming that the Court has severely weakened antidiscrimination statutes). 
114 KOPPELMAN & WOLFF, supra note 59, at 28. 
115 Id. at 29. 
116 Dale, 530 U.S. at 653. 
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Wolff argue, “[Chief Justice Rehnquist] does not explain why the log-
ic of his opinion does not lead to that conclusion.  If there is a stop-
ping point, the court does not say where it is located.”117  Koppelman 
and Wolff also criticize the Supreme Court for its quick conclusion 
that Dale’s mere presence in the Boy Scouts would send a contrary 
message.  While it seems wrong of them to suggest that the Court 
reached this conclusion as a matter of law118—the Court based this 
finding on some evidence, however thin it was—they are justified in 
arguing that this question, which they call one of “cultural anthro-
pology,” requires more of an interrogation than the Court made.119  
Unless, of course, what the Court really meant to say in Dale was that 
antidiscrimination laws are unconstitutional in their application any 
time that obeying them would be construed as the endorsement of 
some message. 
It is hard to find serious fault in Koppelman and Wolff’s critique.  
The Court was extremely deferential to the Boy Scouts’ account of 
what message it wished to send, as well as how that message could be 
disrupted by Dale’s presence.  It was deferential in a way that seemed 
to open the door to any organization claiming an expressive interest 
in noncompliance with antidiscrimination law.  There is a lot to the 
Koppelman-Wolff critique, and I do not cover all of it here, but they 
seem to me quite justified in questioning the Supreme Court’s defer-
ence to the Boy Scouts, and searching in vain for a limiting principle 
in the opinion.120 
We may, though, question whether Dale was really the disastrous, 
“anarchic,”121 and “pathological”122 decision Koppelman and Wolff ar-
 
117 KOPPELMAN AND WOLFF, supra note 59, at 29. 
118 Id. at 36. 
119 Id. 
120 I do not want to suggest, of course, that Dale is simply indefensible.  Michael Stokes 
Paulsen has proven the opposite to be true.  See Paulsen, supra note 58, at 1921–36.  
Building on Roberts and other cases, Paulsen articulates the contours of the expressive as-
sociation right in a manner that should not be controversial and then claims “[Dale] is 
likewise an easy case under Roberts’ rule that interference with the internal structure of a 
group can violate that group’s freedom of expressive association.”  Id. at 1931.  What 
Paulsen does not speak to, however, is the gulf between the factual inquiries the Court 
made of the Jaycees’ expressive claims in Roberts and the Court’s near-total deference to 
the Boy Scouts’ expressive claims in Dale.  Nor does he speak, really, to the constitutional 
balancing of interests the Roberts Court commanded as the final prong of the analysis.  See 
id. (“Once the nature of the Boy Scouts as an expressive association is recognized, every-
thing else follows.”).  Instead, Paulsen implicitly attributes that scrutiny differential to 
Roberts being a harder case that “represents the narrow, commercial-context, business-
networking, no-evidence-of-impairment-of-expression exception to the broader freedom-
of-expressive-association First Amendment rule.”  Id. at 1926. 
121 KOPPELMAN & WOLFF, supra note 59, at 40. 
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gue it was, because their analysis goes on to concede that in FAIR the 
Supreme Court “retreated” from and “defused” its suspect implica-
tions.123  Not only that, but Koppelman and Wolff explain in some de-
tail how other courts have managed not to take Dale to its feared con-
clusions, and to narrow its holding to the particular facts of the case 
in a way that limits its future applications.124  Indeed, before the Sol-
omon Amendment litigation got underway, the authors note, only 
three reported cases relied on Dale in upholding a freedom of associ-
ation claim, and they seem not to be terribly bothered by those cas-
es.125  And when the Court decided FAIR, it appeared to confine Dale 
to the narrow case in which antidiscrimination law, or some other 
regulation, threatens to interfere with the membership composition 
of a group.  On top of all of that, Dale may, as one scholar has argued, 
actually serve certain liberal causes, such as the preservation of af-
firmative action and university speech codes.126 
B.  Collapsing the Status-Ideology Distinction 
A separate critique of Dale, though not wholly unrelated to the 
Court’s astounding deference to the Boy Scouts’ associational claims, 
is that it collapsed what seemed to be a workable belief—status dis-
tinction in the adjudication of expressive association claims with its 
origins in Roberts.127  In Hurley, for example, the Court was moved by 
the fact that the Veterans Council wanted to exclude only GLIB from 
marching under a banner with an identifiable message, not all homo-
sexuals categorically.128  But when it came to Dale, which relied heavily 
 
122 Id. at 43. 
123 Id. at 43–45. 
124 Id. at 49–51. 
125 Id. at 51. 
126 See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 60, at 630–41 (explaining that private universities, like rac-
ist and sexist organizations, also discriminate due their strong belief in the importance of 
racial diversity). 
127 See Goldberg, supra note 27, at 136, 144 (explaining that in Roberts, “the Court took a first 
step towards drawing a line between a group’s desire to exclude members based on status 
(or immutable characteristics) and a group’s ability to select its membership based on 
chosen beliefs or conduct,” whereas in Dale, the Court “relied on the fact that expressive 
association contains both speech and conduct elements, such that the mere presence of 
certain individuals may distort a group’s message”).  In fairness, Goldberg does not seem 
to offer this as a criticism as much as descriptive account of how the status-belief distinc-
tion evolved from Roberts. 
128 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 572 (1995) (“Peti-
tioners disclaim any intent to exclude homosexuals as such, and no individual member of 
GLIB claims to have been excluded from parading as a member of any group that the 
Council has approved to march.  Instead, the disagreement goes to the admission of 
GLIB as its own parade unit carrying its own banner.”). 
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on Hurley, the Court seemed to conflate the banner with the person 
carrying it in accepting the Boy Scouts’ argument that, as one critic 
puts it, “people who are openly homosexual are, whether consciously 
or not, constantly propagandizing for approval of homosexuality by 
their mere presence.”129  The result is that “status and conduct are 
conflated to justify treating people differently on account of their 
sexual orientation.”130 
C.  The Expressiveness of Outness 
Another critique of Dale expresses frustration with the Supreme 
Court for blindly accepting that one’s mere identification as gay 
speaks, and brands him with an outness, as it were, that is inherently 
expressive and perhaps even dangerously so.131  As one critic puts the 
point, Dale “emblazons every homosexual with a Scarlet ‘H,’ loudly 
proclaiming the presence of homosexuality with all its attendant mes-
sages.”132  The Court could not have been more clear, after all, that a 
heterosexual scoutmaster who opposes the Boy Scouts’ view of homo-
sexuality just is not the same kind of problem as a scoutmaster who is 
actually gay:  “The presence of an avowed homosexual and gay rights 
activist in an assistant scoutmaster’s uniform sends a distinctly differ-
ent message from the presence of a heterosexual assistant scoutmas-
ter who is on record as disagreeing with Boy Scouts policy.”133  This 
school of criticism interrogates the relationship between being an 
“avowed homosexual” and expression with respect to homosexuality. 
This critique is captured by Justice Stevens’ dissenting remark that 
 
129 Arthur S. Leonard, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale:  The “Gay Rights Activist” as Constitution-
al Pariah, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 27, 30 (2001). 
130 Id.; see also James P. Madigan, Questioning the Coercive Effect of Self-Identifying Speech, 87 IOWA 
L. REV. 75, 82 (2001) (“The gist of Roberts is that an organization cannot use a person’s 
status as a proxy for the individual’s ideology.  More specifically, an individual who avows 
that she shares the organization’s philosophy cannot have an ulterior, hostile agenda at-
tributed to her based solely on her status.”). 
131 See, e.g., Nancy J. Knauer, Homosexuality as Contagion:  From The Well of Loneliness to the 
Boy Scouts, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 401, 406–07 (2000) (explaining the belief among pro-
family activists that any public image of a homosexual that is not negative, including the 
presence of an openly gay person, sends “normal people” and children a dangerous mes-
sage). 
132 Christopher S. Hargis, The Scarlet Letter “H”:  The Brand Left After Dale, 11 LAW & 
SEXUALITY 209, 235 (2002).  The problem with this branding, as Hargis sees it, is that ra-
ther than searching for Dale’s views, the Court “presumed a set of views concomitant with 
his status as a homosexual and proceeded to pit those views against the views of the Boy 
Scouts.”  Id. at 236. 
133 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655–56 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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[t]he only apparent explanation for the majority’s holding, then, is that 
homosexuals are simply so different from the rest of society that their 
presence alone—unlike any other individual’s—should be singled out for 
special First Amendment treatment.  Under the majority’s reasoning, an 
openly gay male is irreversibly affixed with the label “homosexual.”  That 
label, even though unseen, communicates a message that permits his ex-
clusion wherever he goes.  His openness is the sole and sufficient justifi-
cation for his ostracism.134 
James Madigan does an exemplary job of taking this critique and 
running with it.  Madigan’s core challenge to Dale is that “self-
identified homosexuals are not . . . message-creatures—they are peo-
ple.”135  In Madigan’s eye, Dale’s mere identification as gay in one 
context (a college student at Rutgers) carries with it no determinate 
message that can be grafted onto him in some other context (the Boy 
Scouts), particularly when that second context can structure or regu-
late his expression.  As Madigan sees it, one’s self-identification as gay 
is simply a descriptive statement that could be made for any number 
of reasons, and it need not carry with it, wherever one goes, any par-
ticular message with respect to that identification or any “social or 
normative prescription.”136  If Dale were a vegetarian, after all, would 
that choice necessarily be seen as validated by the Boy Scouts? 
The flipside of this argument, and a potential critique of Dale, is 
that sexual identity is in fact expressive, and that the law has not de-
veloped the adequate doctrinal tools to afford this “expressive identi-
ty” adequate protection.137  Nan Hunter has argued, along these lines, 
that when one’s identity is reduced to pure expression, his or her ex-
 
134 Id. at 696.  This reading of Dale is open to question, though.  See McGowan, supra note 15, 
at 140–42.  McGowan is hesitant to read Dale as an expressive identity case because the 
Court referred to Dale not just as a gay man but as a “gay rights activist,” and also because 
such a reading would carry serious consequences for its previous cases and antidiscrimi-
nation law generally.  Id. 
135 See Madigan, supra note 130, at 143. 
136 Id. at 100 (emphasis omitted). 
137 The issue is somewhat peripheral to my analysis, but any discussion of expressive associa-
tion cases cannot fail to mention it.  Nan Hunter’s work is seminal.  See Nan D. Hunter, 
Expressive Identity:  Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2000) 
[hereinafter Hunter, Expressive Identity] (discussing the need for the development of a 
theory of expressive identity to guide courts dealing with claims arising out of identity 
politics); Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV. 1695 (1993) [herein-
after Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality] (exploring the relationship between expression 
and equality in the modern gay rights movement); see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, 
“Closet Case”:  Boy Scouts of America v. Dale and the Reinforcement of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, 
and Transgender Invisibility, 76 TUL. L. REV. 81, 110 (2001) (“The Court’s separation of 
outness and gay status fails to recognize the compelling linkages among outness, identity, 
and equality.  Under the Court’s constricted analysis, sexual identity exists apart from any 
expressive and associational activities.”). 
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clusion from social spaces is justified by a kind of neutral deference 
to the host’s own expression when, in effect, that exclusion perpetu-
ates social inequalities.138  Just as problematic, the expression itself is 
trivialized to the point where it is not recognized as the dissent from 
social devaluation that it inherently is.139  These are the responses to 
and critiques of Dale grounded in critical theory:  they interrogate the 
decision’s—and the law’s—construction of sexual identity and the 
perpetuation of exclusionary norms.140 
V.  THE ILLOGIC OF MESSAGE ATTRIBUTION CLAIMS 
The foregoing critiques, sharp as they are, leave room for the cri-
tique of the expressive association doctrine I want to offer in this Ar-
ticle.  Let us assume the critical theorists are largely wrong, and 
Dale’s identification as gay does, in and of itself, brand him with a 
pro-homosexual message.  Let us also assume Justice Stevens, Kop-
pelman, and Wolff are wrong, and the Boy Scouts has a sincere, iden-
tifiable view that homosexual conduct is immoral and that it wishes to 
impart this view on its young members.  Let us even assume that 
there is nothing the Boy Scouts can do, at the organizational level, to 
dull the expressive nature of Dale’s homosexuality or reaffirm its own 
commitment to heteronormativity.  Even then, I would argue, an ex-
pressive association claim has problems.  Why?  Because it is a leap to 
assume that the mere presence of a gay scoutmaster in the Boy Scouts 
would force the organization to send the message that it approves of 
homosexuality.  And yet, that is precisely the logic of the message at-
tribution claim doing the work for the expressive association claim.  
To begin, it is worth seeing how casually courts have dismissed mes-
sage attribution claims in other contexts. 
 
138 See Hunter, Expressive Identity, supra note 137; Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, supra 
note 137. 
139 For a very interesting treatment of this issue, see Nancy J. Knauer, “Simply So Different”:  
The Uniquely Expressive Character of the Openly Gay Individual After Boy Scouts of America v. 
Dale, 89 KY. L.J. 997, 1072 (2001) (conceding that in contemporary social contexts out-
ness unavoidably sends a message, but arguing that because Dale’s “recognition of the ex-
pressive value of the openly gay individual potentially offers a new level of constitutional 
protection for coming out speech, particularly in the majority of jurisdictions where sex-
ual orientation is not a protected class for purposes of state or local anti-discrimination 
laws”). 
140 For another example, see Marc R. Poirier, Hastening the Kulturkampf:  Boy Scouts of 
America v. Dale and the Politics of American Masculinity, 12 LAW & SEXUALITY 271 (2003) 
(arguing that the decision in Dale will ultimately maintain dialogue about homosexuality 
in youth education). 
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A.  Courts’ Typical Approach to Message Attribution Claims 
Dale is a distressing case, in particular, because previously (and 
since it was decided) the Court has taken a very realistic approach to 
message attribution claims and repeatedly rejected them as fanciful.  
Here, I want to survey a number of other contexts and cases in which 
message attribution cases were rejected—almost out of hand—with 
very little discussion. 
1.  Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. 
We have already seen the Court, in one expressive association 
case, refuse to credit as reasonable the impression that an outsider’s 
speech was attributable to the host organization, in FAIR.  Respond-
ing to the law schools’ argument that accommodating military re-
cruiters “could be viewed as sending the message that [the law 
schools] see nothing wrong with the military’s policies,” the Court 
held that “[n]othing about recruiting suggests that the law schools 
agree with any speech by recruiters.”141  The Court went even further 
than that, questioning whether the law schools’ exclusion of military 
recruiters would really send the message they hoped to send in the 
first place:   
An observer who sees military recruiters interviewing away from the law 
school has no way of knowing whether the law school is expressing its 
disapproval of the military, all the law school’s interview rooms are full, 
or the military recruiters decided for reasons of their own that they 
would rather interview someplace else.142   
This shows willingness on the Court’s part to sharply interrogate at-
tribution claims, and it is the Court’s unwillingness to do that in Dale 
that stands out so much. 
The basic expressive association problem the plaintiffs in Hurley, 
Dale, and FAIR identified—an unwanted member’s speech being im-
puted to the organization, or being identified as that of the organiza-
tion, or getting in the way of the association’s own speech—pops up 
in other contexts, too.  And there, the courts have proven themselves 
not to be pushovers like the Supreme Court was in Dale.  To the con-
trary, in these other contexts, much like the Supreme Court in FAIR, 
courts have sharply questioned message attribution claims, and fre-
quently have rejected them out of hand. 
 
141 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 64–65 (2006). 
142 Id. at 66. 
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2.  Compelled Speech 
This same issue comes up frequently in the compelled speech 
context—where a plaintiff’s argument, generally speaking, is that he 
or she cannot be required to disseminate an ideological message by 
displaying it on his property,143 or cannot be compelled to affirm a 
particular belief.144  While compelled speech may be impermissible 
for other reasons, courts are consistently unwilling to hold that there 
is a risk that such speech will be falsely attributed to the speaker and 
that that is the constitutional problem.145 
 
143 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that New Hampshire could not re-
quire residents to display the state’s “Live Free or Die” message on vehicle license plates). 
144 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that forced salute 
of the American flag and recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance is unconstitutional). 
145 This is a really important point.  The plaintiffs in Wooley, for example, could not credibly 
argue that they would be seen as endorsing the “Live free or die” message when every 
state-issued license plate in New Hampshire carried that message.  And the Supreme 
Court’s opinion did not come close to suggesting that.  Instead, it framed the case in 
terms of the state having an ideological message that it was forcing on its citizens.  Wooley, 
430 U.S. at 715 (“Here, as in Barnette, we are faced with a state measure which forces an 
individual, as part of his daily life—indeed constantly while his automobile is in public 
view—to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view 
he finds unacceptable.  In doing so, the State ‘invades the sphere of intellect and spirit 
which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all of-
ficial control.’” (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642)).  Wooley and Barnette are not message-
attribution cases, then, in any meaningful sense; they turned instead on other First 
Amendment values like the freedom of conscience.  See Madigan, supra note 130, at 113 
(“The problem in Wooley was hardly misattribution . . . . [It] can be classified as an intrin-
sic objection case.”). 
The same can be said of the Supreme Court’s major cases respecting mandatory un-
ion and state bar contributions, in which the Court has held that such contributions can-
not be used for political or issue advocacy that members find objectionable.  See Keller v. 
State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).  
Those cases turn more on a freedom of conscience rationale than they do on any con-
cern about advocacy being falsely attributed to individual contributors.  See, e.g., Abood, 
431 U.S. at 234–35 (“For at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an indi-
vidual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one’s beliefs should 
be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State.  And the 
freedom of belief is no incidental or secondary aspect of the First Amendment’s protec-
tions.” (citation omitted)). 
Just as cases like Wooley and Abood turned on a freedom-of-conscience rationale, 
newspapers cannot be required to print certain content on a freedom-of-the-press ra-
tionale—not on the thinking that what they are forced to print will be attributed to them.  
See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).  At issue in Tornillo was a 
Florida “right of reply” statute that required newspapers to give reply space to political 
candidates it criticized.  The Supreme Court found the statute unconstitutional because 
it interfered with the exercise of editorial control and judgment, not because the candi-
dates’ replies would somehow garble the newspapers’ own criticism of them.  Id. at 258. 
May 2013] EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION DOCTRINE 1491 
 
A seminal case is PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins.146  Before the 
case got to the United States Supreme Court, the California Supreme 
Court had determined that the California constitution protected the 
speech and petitioning of a student group in a privately owned shop-
ping center, even though it was against the shopping center’s regula-
tions.147  The question in PruneYard was whether this violated the 
shopping center’s First Amendment rights under the federal Consti-
tution.  The Court held it did not, in part because “[t]he views ex-
pressed by members of the public in passing out pamphlets or seek-
ing signatures for a petition thus will not likely be identified with 
those of the owner.”148  Moreover, the shopping center was free to 
“expressly disavow any connection with the message by simply posting 
signs in the area where the speakers or handbillers stand.”149 
Subsequent to PruneYard, a number of courts, including the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court, rejected the argument of plaintiffs that be-
ing forced to host or accommodate certain speech would risk their 
being identified with that speech.  For example, a Massachusetts law 
requiring landlords to permit the installation of cable television 
equipment did not threaten to associate them with the contents of 
cable programming.150  An African American citizen of Georgia could 
not credibly argue that the racist connotations present in the state 
flag, which was reminiscent of the Confederate flag, would be seen as 
commanding his or her allegiance.151  A contraceptive coverage re-
quirement for group insurance plans did not infringe the First 
Amendment rights of a faith-based organization by forcing it to en-
 
146 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
147 Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341 (1979). 
148 Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 87. 
149 Id.  In the wake of the California Supreme Court’s PruneYard decision, it has become a 
contested question what makes a particular commercial establishment a public forum 
under state law, such that it cannot exclude speakers.  The answer does not turn, though, 
on whether the speech at issue could be attributed to the establishment, but on a range 
of factors, such as whether the property owner has opened the property to the public, the 
scope of the invitation to the public, and whether the property includes common areas 
that encourage people to come together.  See, e.g., Slevin v. Home Depot, 120 F. Supp. 2d 
822 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that the main exit of a Home Depot store is not a public 
forum); Van v. Target Corp., 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 497 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the front 
of a Target store is not a public forum); Trader Joe’s Co. v. Progressive Campaigns, Inc., 
86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 442 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a Trader’s Joe’s storefront is not a 
public forum). 
150 Greater Worcester Cablevision, Inc. v. Carabetta Enters., 682 F. Supp. 1244, 1255 (D. 
Mass. 1985) (“[T]here is no reason to believe that Lincoln’s tenants will assume that Lin-
coln endorses messages transmitted into tenants’ apartments at their request.”). 
151 Coleman v. Miller, 912 F. Supp. 522, 530 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (“[T]he courts finds that enter-
ing a public building displaying the flag is an insufficient action to associate Plaintiff with 
its message.”). 
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gage in symbolic, pro-contraceptive speech.152  Requiring cable televi-
sion providers to carry local broadcast stations did not risk associating 
them with the stations’ messages.153  And employers required to hang 
a National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) poster detailing its con-
tact information and employees’ various rights could not claim that 
they would be identified with the NLRB’s message.154 
3.  Establishment Clause Cases 
Message attribution claims also come up when the government re-
fuses to tolerate or assist religious speech on the worry that doing so 
will be seen as endorsing it in violation of the Establishment Clause.155  
This comes up, of course, because the question of whether the gov-
ernment will be seen as conveying a message that religion or a partic-
ular religious belief is favored is central to the Establishment Clause 
analysis.156 
 
152 Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 808 N.Y.S.2d 447, 460 (App. Div. 
2006) (“Given plaintiffs’ well-known religious beliefs regarding contraception, we cannot 
conclude that there is a ‘great likelihood’ that plaintiffs’ provision of contraceptive cover-
age to its employees would be perceived as anything more than compliance under protest 
with a statutory mandate that is generally applicable to all employers offering group 
health insurance coverage.”). 
153 Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC., 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994) (“Given cable’s long history of serv-
ing as a conduit for broadcast signals, there appears little risk that cable viewers would as-
sume that the broadcast stations carried on a cable system convey ideas or messages en-
dorsed by the cable operator.  Indeed, broadcasters are required by federal regulation to 
identify themselves at least once every hour, and it is a common practice for broadcasters 
to disclaim any identity of viewpoint between the management and the speakers who use 
the broadcast facility.” (citation omitted)). 
154 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 846 F. Supp. 2d 34, 59–60 (D.D.C. 2012) (“[N]othing in the 
notice posting suggests that employers favor collective bargaining activities, and nothing 
in the regulation restricts what the employers may say about the Board’s policies.  Since 
the notice simply recites what the law is, employers could not possibly have an alternative 
message that posting the notice could affect.”). 
155 There is a lot to be said, obviously, about this so-called “Endorsement Test” and its place 
in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and I do not address it here with the intention of 
diving into that discussion.  See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Ceremonial Deism and the Rea-
sonable Religious Outsider, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1545 (2010); Steven Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, 
and Doctrinal Illusions:  Establishment Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. 
REV. 266 (1987); Mark Strasser, The Protection and Alienation of Religious Minorities:  On the 
Evolution of the Endorsement Test, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 667. 
Instead, I want to point to a narrow set of cases in which courts have held, I think 
without controversy, that government tolerance of religion, or particular kinds of support 
for religious conduct, cannot reasonably be thought to communicate the message that it 
endorses or favors religion or that the religious content is attributable to the government. 
156 See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593 (1989). 
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The Supreme Court has repeatedly dismissed that worry, however, 
as in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia.157  In 
Rosenberger, a campus Christian group challenged the University’s 
unwillingness, based on Establishment Clause concerns, to subsidize 
the printing costs of its publication “Wide Awake” with student activi-
ty funds.158  The Fourth Circuit affirmed the University’s concerns, 
holding that contributing student funds to “Wide Awake” would 
“send an unmistakably clear signal that the University of Virginia 
supports Christian values and wishes to promote the wide promulga-
tion of such values.”159 
The Supreme Court flatly rejected this conclusion:  “The Court of 
Appeals’ apparent concern that Wide Awake’s religious orientation 
would be attributed to the University is not a plausible fear, and there 
is no real likelihood that the speech in question is being either en-
dorsed or coerced by the State.”160 
In an earlier case, the Court, along similar lines, dismissed the 
concerns of a school district that granting official recognition to a 
Christian student group would be construed as an endorsement of 
the group’s religious purposes.161  A nearly identical case is Widmar v. 
Vincent, in which the Court allowed that a university’s so-called “open 
forum” policy for student groups could welcome those with religious 
objectives, largely because this “does not confer any imprimatur of 
state approval on religious sects or practices.”162  The Ninth Circuit, in 
this spirit, has flatly dismissed the concern of the California Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles that allowing religious advocacy on DMV 
premises would connote state approval or endorsement of religion.163 
4.  Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. 
Southworth 
The Supreme Court upheld a mandatory student activity fee at the 
University of Wisconsin, over the objections of some students that 
 
157 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
158 Id. at 825. 
159 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 286 (4th Cir. 1994). 
160 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 841–42. 
161 Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (“We think that secondary school students 
are mature enough and are likely to understand that a school does not endorse or sup-
port student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis . . . . The proposi-
tion that schools do not endorse everything they fail to censor is not complicated.”). 
162 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981). 
163 Jaffe v. Alexis, 659 F.2d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 1981) (“We believe that the Department’s 
fears that the public will attribute the Krishnas’ views to the State of California are not on-
ly unsubstantiated in the record, but have no basis in reality.”). 
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they were being forced to subsidize the objectionable speech of or-
ganizations to which the fees were distributed.164  So long as funds 
were allocated on a viewpoint neutral basis, however—and the parties 
agreed they were—the Supreme Court held that nobody would get 
the mistaken impression that every recipient organization spoke for 
all contributing students.165  Similar in logic to Southworth, the gov-
ernment’s mere granting of a parade permit to a discriminatory party 
does not amount to the state espousing discriminatory principles.166 
5.  Private Speakers at Private Events 
Other courts have followed the Supreme Court’s lead here, even if 
not relying explicitly on the logic of PruneYard that an outsider’s 
speech cannot automatically be attributed to the host party.  One line 
of cases, for example, holds, at least partially on this basis, that city-
permitted events open to the public, even though hosted by a private 
party, cannot exclude other private speakers:  a Sparks, Nevada rib 
cook-off could not exclude a group collecting signatures for a recall 
petition;167 a “National Coming Out Day” celebration in Philadelphia 
could not turn away counter-protestors in attendance to offer a dif-
ferent view of homosexuality;168 permit-holding event sponsors in 
Portland, Oregon could not evict an evangelic preacher even though 
an ordinance ostensibly allowed them to do so;169 a Columbus, Ohio 
riverfront arts festival could not exclude a man wearing a sign bearing 
 
164 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000). 
165 Id. at 233. 
166 Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Md. Chapter v. Mayor of Thurmont, 
700 F. Supp. 281, 287 (D. Md. 1988) (“If the Town’s parade permission procedure were 
to automatically grant permission to every group which wished to parade peacefully (as it 
does for use of park pavilions), it would be clear to all that the Town does not support 
each parading group.”). 
167 Dietrich v. John Ascuaga’s Nugget, 548 F.3d 892, 899 (9th Cir. 2008).  The cook-off 
wished not to be identified with political speech, and the Ninth Circuit held “there is little 
chance that the public would have viewed Plaintiff’s petitioning activities as endorsed by 
the Cook-Off.  To the extent that such a concern existed, Defendant Nugget easily could 
have disclaimed Plaintiff’s activities with a sign or through some other simple mecha-
nism.”  Id. at 899. 
168 Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 196 (3rd Cir. 2008) (“Appellants were dissenting 
speakers on the Philadelphia streets and sidewalks where OutFest took place.  There was 
no danger of confusion that Appellants’ speech would be confused with the message in-
tended by Philly Pride.”). 
169 Gathright v. City of Portland, 439 F.3d 573, 578 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Here, there is no risk 
that Gathright’s provocations could be mistaken by anybody as part of the message of the 
events he protests . . . . Dale’s holding, like Hurley’s, was grounded in whether the plain-
tiff’s views could be mistaken for those of the defendant.”). 
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religious descriptions and distributing religious literature;170 a Memo-
rial Day air show honoring veterans in Columbia, Missouri could not 
exclude antiwar protestors or someone collecting signatures for a re-
newable energy initiative;171and a Minnesota gay pride parade could 
not exclude an evangelical Christian there to talk about his faith and 
hand out bibles.172  Even a permitted, public Ku Klux Klan rally on 
private property could not limit the audience to white gentiles.173 
B.  The Best of All Possible Meanings 
In all of the above cases, courts made what seemed like an ad hoc 
decision that compelled association would not infringe the speech in-
terests of an organization because the speech of the person the or-
ganization was forbidden from excluding could not reasonably be at-
tributed back to the organization.  Unlike in Dale, in these cases there 
was not much of a dispute as to what the compelled associate’s mes-
sage actually was.  What we do not get in these cases, or even in the 
more seminal Supreme Court cases, however, is some deeper expla-
nation as to why the message attribution claim fails.  The courts simp-
ly reject the message attribution claim, and that is that.  In FAIR, for 
example, the Supreme Court simply said that military recruiters are 
outsiders and everyone knows it, and to the extent there is any confu-
sion, the law schools themselves could clear it up.  That was the end 
of the discussion.  Ditto in Dale:  Dale’s presence would send the mes-
sage that the Boy Scouts approves of homosexuality, period.  And the 
same held true in PruneYard:  shopping mall visitors would be unlikely 
 
170 Parks v. City of Columbus, 395 F.3d 643, 651 (6th Cir. 2005) (“If, however, we were to 
construe the message of the Arts Festival to be ‘visual and performance art,’ nothing in 
the record indicates that Parks interfered with or prevented this ‘message’ from being 
conveyed.  In fact, Parks was merely another attendee of the festival, walking up and 
down the street.”). 
171 Wickersham v. City of Columbia, 481 F.3d 591, 600 (8th Cir. 2007) (“There is no evidence 
that Salute’s message was diluted by the presence of a small number of sign carriers and 
leafleters at the . . . air show, which was attended by over 25,000 people.  Appellees sought 
only to express their own views as spectators at the air show, and their signs and leaflets 
were not likely [to] be identified with Salute.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
172 Gay-Lesbian-Bisexual-Transgender Pride/Twin Cities v. Minneapolis Park & Recreation 
Bd., 721 F. Supp. 2d 866, 873 (D. Minn. 2010) (“Assuming that Johnson attends the Pride 
Festival and conveys such a dissenting message, the Court finds that there would be no 
danger of confusion that Johnson’s speech would be confused with the message intended 
by Twin Cities Pride.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
173 NAACP v. Thompson, 648 F. Supp. 195 (D. Md. 1986).  The lengthy opinion does not 
address head-on a potential attribution argument—and maybe the Klan did not make 
one—but suffice it to say no reasonable person would attribute to the Ku Klux Klan the 
views of NAACP members who show up in protest at a Klan rally. 
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to identify the positions of signature-seekers with the mall ownership.  
The Court had nothing else to say. 
But let us think about FAIR and consider what else the Supreme 
Court could have said, just to drive home the problem with the mes-
sage attribution claim made in that case.  The presence of military re-
cruiters, in the eyes of students and outsiders, could mean any num-
ber of things apart from the law schools’ approval of “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell,” or acceptance of employment discrimination generally.  
It could mean that (1) the law schools respect students with an inter-
est in the JAG Corps and do not want to inconvenience them by mar-
ginalizing the recruiters with whom they need to meet; (2) the law 
schools respect the autonomy of their students to decide on their 
own whether to interview with the military, and do not want to be 
seen as weighing in on that independent moral decision in any way; 
(3) the law schools know they have been more than clear about their 
view of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and do not need to marginalize mili-
tary recruiters to supplement or reiterate this view; (4) the law 
schools recognize that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is the law, duly enact-
ed by a democratic Congress after rich debate, and that no small 
number of military members and recruiters may well oppose it, too;174 
(5) the law schools are committed to the “robust exchange of ideas,” 
even when that requires them to accommodate speakers who express 
or stand for something they find morally objectionable; and (6) the 
law schools think it is most effective to protest “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
in the presence of military recruiters, rather than in their absence.175 
We could run an identical thought experiment in Dale.  Even as-
suming Dale’s homosexuality was itself expressive, and even assuming 
that he would be seen as a banner for gay equality, it would remain 
 
174 This was indeed one glitch in FAIR’s litigation position—that it was the military that was 
the object of its egalitarian ire.  The military did not come up with “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell”—Congress did.  See Nelson Polsby, Polsby:  “Barely A First Amendment Case At All,” ACS 
BLOG (Nov. 30, 2005), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/polsby-barely-a-first-amendment-
case-at-all (“F.A.I.R.’s members must surely be aware that it is not the military that is actu-
ally making the policy that they don’t like.  It isn’t up to the armed services to determine 
who is eligible to serve and who is not.  ‘Don’t ask, don’t tell’ is a statute—the law of the 
land.  The law schools, if they are morally serious, should boycott the organizations actu-
ally responsible for that law.”). 
175 A Yale Law School professor actually made some of these points in arguing against the 
school’s position in the Solomon Amendment litigation.  See Peter Schuck, Fighting on the 
Wrong Front, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/09/
opinion/09schuck.html?_r=0 (“The issue is not what the universities think about ‘don’t 
ask, don’t tell’—they have made that clear—but how their students view it.  A university’s 
moral and pedagogical duty to its students is to cultivate their capacity for independent 
thinking, explain its own view (if it has one) and then get out of the way.  The students’ 
duty is to listen carefully—and then make their own decisions.”). 
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an open question whether the Boy Scout’s inclusion of him could 
reasonably be understood as approval of homosexuality at the organ-
izational level.  Are there reasons the Boy Scouts may accept a gay 
scoutmaster even though, as an organization, it professes disapproval 
of homosexual conduct?  Of course there are—lots of them. 
Perhaps James Dale (as the record in the case suggested) was an 
exemplary scout himself and, on balance, a net asset to the organiza-
tion.  Perhaps the Boy Scouts operate on a model of moral education 
whereby the organization voices its position on moral questions, but 
exposes its members to the alternatives and respects their autono-
mous decisions.  Perhaps the Boy Scouts believes its position on ho-
mosexuality is abundantly clear, and that it does not need to exclude 
homosexuals to enhance or supplement that position.  Perhaps the 
Boy Scouts, however strong its view of homosexual conduct, is com-
mitted first to respecting the laws on the books, even those that put 
the organization in a compromising position.  Perhaps the Boy Scouts 
wanted to use James Dale as an anti-example—that is, the organiza-
tion could point to him as a homosexual and implore its members 
not to conduct their lives as he conducted his.  Perhaps the Boy 
Scouts thought the best way to communicate its disapproval of homo-
sexuality was in his presence, while also taking a public stand against 
the nondiscrimination law that compelled the organization to accept 
Dale. 
When we consider these possibilities, or any other explanations 
for James Dale’s continued presence in the Boy Scouts, we see clearly 
the problem with Justice Rehnquist’s assertion in Dale that “Dale’s 
presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the very least, force the organi-
zation to send a message, both to the youth members and the world, 
that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form 
of behavior.”176  That is simply not true.  The “message” to which Jus-
tice Rehnquist refers, of course, is not the Boy Scouts’ message—Dale’s 
presence does not force the organization to say anything, nor does it 
prevent the organization from saying anything—but rather the im-
pression of onlookers, whether from within the organization or from 
the outside.  And that impression—the Boy Scouts must approve of 
homosexuality because there is a homosexual among them—is one of 
numerous impressions to be drawn.  And it is far from the most rea-
sonable.  Finally, while the Boy Scouts may be entitled to deference 
on what its views are and what might impair the expression of its 
views, its guess as to what others might think is not, because it is really 
 
176 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000). 
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just that:  a guess.  The Boy Scouts is in no better position than any-
one else in the world to know or intuit what a third party observer 
might think when he or she sees a gay scoutmaster in its ranks. 
And so, it is with all message attribution claims that yoke an asso-
ciational interest to an expressive one.  The fact is that compelled as-
sociation does not require an organization to say anything, nor does 
it prevent an organization from saying anything.  Indeed, there is 
nothing deliberately communicative about association from the or-
ganization’s end at all.177  The question of whether its message is di-
luted or interfered with by the presence of an unwanted person is a 
question of what an observing third party might reasonably infer 
from the presence of that person.  And there will always be some ex-
planation available, or some rational inference, other than the organ-
ization’s acceptance or approval of what that unwanted person stands 
for. 
The working premise of message attribution claims is that no or-
ganization would ever tolerate a member whose values and conduct 
are not in line with every last organizational principle, and that a sin-
gle “defect” in a member, for lack of a better word, is categorically 
disqualifying.  It is only in the abstractions of constitutional argument 
that that premise holds water.  Sure, there are some instances where a 
single personal attribute is categorically disqualifying—a Jew could 
never become the Pope—but in reality a person is never a truly per-
fect fit for anything; in our personal relationships, in our social rela-
tionships, and in our professional relationships, we suffer one anoth-
er’s inadequacies because in the aggregate we gain something for it.  
That does not mean that we do not see their inadequacies as such 
and are seen as endorsing them.  It merely means associating with 
them is a net positive, and with the good (or even the great) we take 
some bad.  It is against that backdrop that Dale seems most absurd, 
and that message attribution claims generally seem dead on arrival.  
The Boy Scouts may very well not wish to associate with homosexuals, 
but it is another argument altogether that they will be seen as endors-
ing homosexuality just because a scoutmaster is gay. 
When the Third Circuit found the Solomon Amendment uncon-
stitutional, Judge Aldisert invoked the principles of logic in a sharp 
dissent.  What is interesting is that for Judge Aldisert, the logic ques-
 
177 See John Greenman, On Communication, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1337 (2008) 
(“[C]ommunication occurs when Person A conveys a thought to Person B, and Person B 
freely chooses whether to accept that thought.  An act is communicative, in other words, 
if the important change that A wants to make in B’s mind occurs only when B wills it 
to . . . .”). 
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tion in the case preceded the First Amendment question altogether.  
The logic question was not what people might think of a discrimina-
tory recruiter being on law schools’ campuses, but rather whether it 
was logical, in the first instance, to see the military as discriminatory, 
or to infer discrimination from the recruiters’ presence.  Now, argua-
bly this question can be stuffed into the expressive association analy-
sis—it is analogous to whether James Dale radiates homosexuality just 
because he is gay—and in particular into the middle prong that asks 
whether an organization’s message will be compromised by the pres-
ence of an unwanted member.  But Judge Aldisert located it else-
where.  On the subject of inference, he wrote: 
Inference is a process where the thinker passes from one proposition to 
another that is connected with the former in some way.  But for the pas-
sage to be valid, it must be made according to the laws of logic that per-
mit a reasonable movement from one proposition to another. . . . The 
passage cannot be mere speculation, intuition or guessing.  The key to a 
logical inference is the reasonable probability that the conclusion flows 
from the evidentiary datum because of past experience in human af-
fairs.178 
From here, Judge Aldisert just refused to accept that “the mere 
presence of a uniformed military recruiter permits or compels the in-
ference that a law school’s anti-discrimination policy is violated.”179  
Again, this is before he got to the Roberts expressive association analy-
sis.  Judge Aldisert was taking on, up front, the very premise that the 
military recruiters would be identified as discriminators.  When he 
got to the Roberts analysis, he wrote not in terms of what was a logical 
inference, but simply that there was no likelihood that the military’s 
message and the law schools’ would be conflated, especially consider-
ing the law schools’ known opposition to “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and 
its continued ability to speak out against it: 
Here, in contrast, the likelihood that members of a law school com-
munity will perceive a military recruiter’s on-campus activities as reflect-
ing the school’s “customary determination” that the recruiter’s message 
is “worthy of presentation and quite possibly of support” is vanishingly 
small.  Unlike bystanders watching a passing parade, law school students, 
and to be sure, their professors, are an extraordinarily sophisticated and 
well-informed group, who understand perfectly well that their schools 
admit military recruiters not because they endorse any “message” that 
may be conveyed by the recruiters’ brief and transitory appearance on 
campus, but because the economic consequences of the Solomon 
Amendment have induced them to do so.  The likelihood that the mili-
 
178 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 252 (3rd Cir. 
204) (Aldisert, J., dissenting). 
179 Id. 
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tary’s recruiting will be seen as part of a law school’s own message is par-
ticularly small when schools can take—and have taken—ameliorative 
steps to publicize their continuing disagreement with the military’s poli-
cies and the reasons for their acquiescence in military recruiting.180 
It is important to see, though, that this is also a question of logical 
inference even if Judge Aldisert’s did not explicitly treat it as one.  In 
other words, Judge Aldisert’s reasoning about whether military re-
cruiters could logically be viewed as discriminators could apply equal-
ly well to the question of whether, assuming the military recruiters 
were identified as discriminators, their discrimination would be at-
tributed to the law schools so as to garble their message of tolerance.  
Is there a reasonable probability that the Boy Scouts would be seen as 
endorsing homosexual conduct by including a homosexual in its 
ranks?  Would this conclusion, in Judge Aldisert’s words, “flow[] from 
the evidentiary datum because of past experience in human af-
fairs?”181  The answer has to be at least, “Not necessarily.” 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court recognized in Dale that “[t]he forced inclu-
sion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group’s freedom 
of expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a 
significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or private view-
points.”182  The word “presence” there matters.  Dale would not have 
been a front-page case if he had been expelled from the Boy Scouts 
for explicit pro-homosexual advocacy.  But he was not expelled for 
that.  He was expelled simply for being gay and on the assumption that 
his presence would send a particular message that was at odds with 
the Boy Scouts’ own.  Similarly, the law schools in FAIR may have had 
a very different case if the military recruiters devoted a portion of 
their on-campus “recruiting” efforts to defending “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell” and arguing for the inferior social treatment of homosexuals.  
But that was not and could not have been their argument.  They 
wanted to exclude the military recruiters categorically, simply because 
of what they were assumed to stand for. 
I have argued in this Article that for organizations to get around 
antidiscrimination laws and exclude categories of people outright—
to not even allow their presence—they must make a message attribu-
tion claim.  That is, they must assert that the unwanted members 
 
180 Id. at 257. 
181 Id. at 252. 
182 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000). 
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stand for something, and that what they stand for will be attributed to 
the organization if it cannot exclude him. 
There are two problems with this that I have tried to highlight.  
The first problem is doctrinal:  There will always be some available 
explanation for an unwanted member’s presence other than the or-
ganization’s endorsement of what he or she stands for.  As Chemerin-
sky and Fisk ask, does a Catholic University’s employment of a Jewish 
law professor mean its commitment to Catholicism is squishy, and 
that it will be seen as affirming tenets of the Jewish faith?183  To ask 
that question is to answer it.  The consequence of this is that if we re-
ally think association merits constitutional protection, we may have to 
either (1) broaden the interest in “expression” to encompass more 
than how someone’s mere presence will ultimately affect the dissemi-
nation of an organization’s message; or (2) reconfigure the constitu-
tional relationship between association and speech in the first place, 
perhaps by simply decoupling the two. 
The second problem goes more to the ad hoc manner in which 
message attribution claims are adjudicated.  The question of whether 
compelled association will get in the way of an organization’s message 
is really a question of what third parties will infer from the associa-
tion.  And courts must do better than the ad hoc speculation that we 
see wherever message attribution claims are made.  Even if, in our 
eyes, they get the answer right, they do so in a completely under the-
orized manner that leaves the doctrine guessing from one case to the 
next. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
183 See Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 105, at 602–03. 
